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INTRODUCTION

O

n July 1, 2018, the Multilateral Convention to Implement
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, called the Multilateral Instrument
(MLI) for short, entered into force.1 The MLI, negotiated under
the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), provides an efficient solution to
update thousands of international double taxation treaties
1. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
Base
Erosion
and
Profit
Sharing
(June
7,
2017),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-taxtreaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf [hereinafter MLI].
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(DTTs) in one stroke. It introduces novel provisions that curb
tax avoidance, close loopholes for treaty shopping, and
strengthen enforcement in order to reduce tax base erosion and
profit shifting (BEPS).2 This article uses a comparative international law framework to investigate the extent to which the
MLI provides a model for reforming the more than three thousand mostly bilateral international investment agreements
(IIAs).
The international tax and investment regimes display striking similarities when it comes to their policy goals, structure,
and normative evolution, which make them natural comparators. Both regimes underpin the global flow of capital by disciplining fiscal and regulatory host state conduct in relation to
foreign investment. They are each built on a decentralized
network of thousands of mostly bilateral treaties that have
been concluded over several decades and connect countries
across the globe. Finally, they share common historical foundations, underwent parallel codification efforts at the League of
Nations and OECD, experienced failed attempts at multilateralization, and survived similar periods of contestation that
first pitted capital exporting against capital importing nations
and later corporations against taxpayers. Yet, in spite of their
many commonalities, there has been relatively little scholarly
work that systematically compares both regimes.3
Recent developments make a comparison between both fields
even more worthwhile. The MLI promises to efficiently alleviate a decades-long legitimacy crisis in international tax law.
The tax regime had long focused on easing cross-border capital
flows by preventing double taxation, but in so doing, it inadvertently facilitated double non-taxation, corporate fiscal eva2. Samuel Johnston, Multilateral Tax Convention to Prevent Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Legislation Notes, 23 AUCKL. UNIV. L. REV. 384, 384 93
(2017). On BEPS, see OECD, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO THE MULTILATERAL
CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT
BEPS (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf.
3. Notable examples include Julien Chaisse, International Investment
Law and Taxation: From Coexistence to Cooperation, (International Centre
for Trade and Sustainable Development, E15 Work. Pap. 24, 2016); Julien
Chaisse, Making Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective – The
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project and Beyond, 10 CONTEMP. ASIA
ARBITR. J. 1, 1 50 (2017); Rodrigo Polanco Lazo et al., The Relationship Between Investment and Double Taxation Treaties: The Chilean Case, 29 CAD.
CRH 151, 151 70 (2016).
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sion, and harmful tax competition.4 The MLI counters such
practices by closing gaps in existing DTTs through new multilateral minimum standards that address the field’s legitimacy
concerns. International investment law, in turn, has been facing its own legitimacy crisis. States and stakeholders are debating how much protection to afford investors and how to
structure investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).5 Multilateral efforts to reform the investment regime have just begun
under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).6 Investment law may
thus have an opportunity to learn from the successful reform of
the tax regime to resolve its own legitimacy crisis.7
This article will argue that there are three lessons in particular that investment lawyers and policymakers can draw from
the MLI experience. First, the mechanics of the MLI can guide
investment law reform. By modifying
but not replacing
parallel DTTs, the MLI retains the bilateral governance structure of the tax regime while complementing it with a carefully
tailored multilateral superstructure.8 This is an attractive pro4. Philipp Genschel & Thomas Rixen, Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of International Taxation, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDERS 154 84 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015).
5. See, e.g., S. A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation
of International Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1037 75 (2010)
(highlighting the need to preserve state policy space); Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521
(2004); Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kwo Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin,
The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, in
THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY,
(Michael Waibel ed., 2010); Malcolm Langford & Daniel Behn, Managing
Backlash: The Evolving Investment Treaty Arbitrator?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L.
551, 551 80 (2018).
6. Stephan W. Schill, Investor–State Dispute Settlement Reform at
UNCITRAL: A Looming Constitutional Moment?, 19 J. WORLD INVEST. &
TRADE 1, 1 5 (2018).
7. International organizations have already begun pointing to the MLI as
a potential model for reforming investment law: U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, 175, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015
(June 24, 2015). OECD, 4th Annual Conference on Investment Treaties: Treaty Shopping and Tools for Treaty Reform (Mar. 12, 2018).
8. Yariv Brauner, McBEPS: The MLI – The First Multilateral Tax Treaty
that Has Never Been, 46 INTERTAX 6, 6 17 (2018) (“the MLI was primarily
devised to preserve the conservative evolution of the international tax re-
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spect for investment law as it offers an alternative to the more
radical option, unsuccessfully pursued in the past, of a multilateral investment treaty that replaces existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs).9
Second, the scope of the MLI can inspire investment law reform. The MLI modifies parallel DTTs, both in substance and
procedure, to address shortcomings in the existing tax system.
Similarly, the weaknesses of the investment regime identified
in the current reform process include not only procedural concerns, such as the independence and impartiality of arbitrators,
but also substantive ones, namely the inconsistency and incorrectness of arbitral decisions.10 The latter cannot realistically
be solved through procedural fixes alone, but also require substantive reforms that clarify (and potentially harmonize) the
scope and content of core obligations such as the requirement
to provide investment with “fair and equitable treatment,”
and that regulate normative grey areas, such as the valuation
of damages in case of a treaty breach.
Finally, the design of the MLI offers valuable lessons to investment treaty negotiators. The MLI sets firm international
minimum standards, but also offers states the opportunity to
select from different compliance options and to contract out of
or around its provisions. The combination of harmonization, on
the one hand, and flexibility, on the other, is arguably similarly
crucial for successful investment law reform, which equally
needs to accommodate divergent state interests and approaches while establishing common standards that promote normative consistency. The MLI thus provides investment lawyers
with a useful template for how to reform a largely bilateral regime on a multilateral basis.
Achieving an MLI for investment law, however, will not be
easy. The tax regime has benefitted from gradual political,
normative, and epistemic convergence over time, whereas the
gime, based on bilaterality, reciprocity and competition, and not as a multilateral tax treaty based on which a new regime shall arise”).
9. The most prominent of these efforts was the OECD’s Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), which failed in the late 1990s, see
UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/ITT/Misc.22
(1999); Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment: Where Now?, INT’L L. 1033 (2000).
10. UNCITRAL Secretariat, Possible reform of investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS), A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149 (Sep. 5, 2018).
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investment regime is currently experiencing a period of divergence. The MLI is a product of the financial crisis; it was forged
through the ensuing G20 political consensus to combat BEPS. 11
Normative convergence facilitated the MLI as DTTs have become more similar over time.12 Finally, a strong transnational
tax expert community underpins the regime,13 which enabled
the swift translation of the BEPS action plan into hard law.
The conditions that gave rise to the MLI are absent in investment law. Among the G20, there is growing disagreement over
how to reform investment treaties.14 Normatively, IIAs have
become more dissimilar as states disagree on the appropriate
design for investment agreements.15 Finally, investment law
does not benefit from a strong epistemic consensus as the field
is divided along national and professional boundaries. The current UNCITRAL reform process, however, may offer an opportunity to start a course of political, normative, and epistemic
convergence for investment law reform that can then pave the
way for a later MLI in investment law.
This article is structured as follows: Parts I and II introduce
international tax and investment law, respectively. Part III reviews the similarities between both regimes to show that they
are natural comparators. Part IV identifies three common
structural challenges that lie at the heart of current reform efforts in both systems, notably: (1) preserving a bilateral governance structure while adding multilateral elements (“mechanics”), (2) efficiently modernizing thousands of existing
treaties in both procedure and substance (“scope”), and (3) setting minimum standards where necessary while allowing for
11. Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, Output Legitimacy Deficits and
the Inclusive Framework of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Initiative, 72 BULL. INT’L TAX. 11 (Jan. 31, 2018).
12. Vincent Arel-Bundock & Lisa Lechner, The Power of Boilerplate: Decentralized Multilateralism and the International Tax Regime (working paper, 2018) (on file with the author).
13. Allison Christians, Networks, Norms and National Tax Policy, 9 WASH.
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Investment Treaties: The Reform Matrix, 112
AJIL UNBOUND 191 (2018).
15. Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Convergence and Divergence in the Investment Treaty Universe – Scoping the Potential for Multilateral Consolidation, 8 TRADE L. DEV. 152 (2016); Wolfgang Alschner, The
Global Laboratory of Investment Law Reform Alternatives, 112 AJIL
UNBOUND 237 (2018).
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flexibility where possible (“design”). Part V introduces the MLI
and explains how it tackles these three structural challenges.
Part VI argues that the mechanics, scope, and design deployed
by the MLI make it an attractive model for investment law reform. Part VII then considers the feasibility of an MLI for investment law. It shows that the conditions that have given rise
to the MLI are not (yet) present in the investment regime. The
article concludes by arguing that the current UNCITRAL process can be a venue for consensus-building in order to create
the necessary conditions for a future MLI in investment law.
I. THE LAW OF DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES
Before comparing the regimes of international tax and investment, it is important to clarify what both are about, beginning with the law of international taxation. International tax
treaties are concerned with the avoidance of double taxation by
allocating taxation rights between the home and host state of
taxpayers.16 Substantively, DTTs seek to ensure that the same
income is not taxed twice. In addition, they also prohibit discrimination between national and foreign taxpayers. Procedurally, they resolve disputes over the right to tax. They do so
primarily through diplomatic channels, although more recent
agreements also foresee a simple arbitration procedure.
A. Substantive Tax Norms: Allocating Taxation Rights
Double taxation avoidance treaties are not about harmonizing domestic taxation choices.17 Taxation sovereignty remains
in the hands of states.18 DTTs instead seek to manage the interaction between national tax jurisdictions where they apply
to the same income. Think of a German company investing in
Canada: which country should tax the revenue generated from
the foreign investment? The country where the investor is from
16. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 99 100 (Karl
P Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
17. THOMAS RIXEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE
64 65 (Achim Hurrelmann et al. eds., 2008).
18. DTTs are thus often described as providing a sovereignty preserving
approach to international tax coordination. Richard J. Vann, A Model Tax
Treaty for the Asian–Pacific Region? 45 BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION, 99, 102 (2010).
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and where it is headquartered that is, the residence state (in
the example, Germany)? Or, the country where the revenue is
generated and “sourced” that is, the source state (in the example, Canada)? When both countries exercise their national
jurisdiction to tax on the same asset, the same income is taxed
twice, creating severe disincentives for companies to invest
abroad.
DTTs solve the problem of double taxation by allocating taxation rights over income and capital between the residence and
source countries. Residence states can mitigate double taxation
unilaterally through tax credits and exemptions for foreignsourced income.19 The “grand bargain” underlying DTTs, however, makes such unilateral relief measures less costly by dividing taxation rights between source and residence states.20
Broadly speaking, active business income is subject to taxation
in the source state.21 Hence, income generated from sales or the
provision of services is taxed in the country where it is generated. In contrast, passive business income, such as royalties,
dividends, or interests, as well as personal income, is generally
subject to taxation in the residence country.22 The specific allocation rules in DTTs, while generally following this distinction,
determine in detail which country has the right to tax what income.23
Two concepts are crucial threshold questions for structuring
the allocation of taxation rights in DTTs. One is the notion of a
“resident” for tax purposes. Residents are normally fully liable
to pay taxes in their state of residence.24 DTTs define residency
19. RIXEN, supra note 17 at 76, 156 61.
20. Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 2016
BYU L. REV. 1603, 1612 13 (2016).
21. This allocation follows the so-called “benefits principle” whereby taxpayers should pay tax where they benefit from ensuing public expenditures.
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 9 13 (2007); See also RIXEN, supra note 17, at 65 66.
22. Avi-Yonah, supra note 21, at 9 13; see also RIXEN, supra note 17, at
65 66.
23. This section is based on the 2017 version of the OECD Model Tax Convention. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Condensed
Version (2017), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/treaties/model-tax-convention-onincome-and-on-capital-condensed-version-20745419.htm [hereinafter OECD
Model Tax Convention].
24. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 65.
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by reference to the domestic law of each contracting party, typically based on factors such as the place of incorporation or
domicile.25 Since an individual or company can be a resident of
more than one state under the respective domestic laws of
those states, DTTs also resolve conflicts of double residence.26
The second concept concerns the notion of “permanent establishment” (PE). If the foreign resident’s presence constitutes a
PE in the source country, that country has the right to tax
their profits.27 In contrast to residency, which is defined by reference to domestic law, DTTs set out in the treaty text what
constitutes a PE and what does not.28 For instance, factories,
branches, or mines count as PEs and would thus be taxed by
the source rather than residence state, but temporary storage
facilitates or offices for the mere collection of information do
not. 29
The majority of substantive provisions in DTTs allocate taxation rights between the residence and source country based on
the type of income.30 Immovable property, for instance, is exclusively taxed in the source country,31 whereas most capital
and royalty payments are taxed in the country of residence.32
Business profits are taxed in the country of residence unless
the entity has a PE in the source country.33 In practice, that
means that the profits of multinational enterprises are apportioned between the residence country (where the parent corporation is located) and the source country (where the subsidiary
is located as a PE). To make this division work, transactions
between parent and subsidiary are typically considered against
the “arms-length standard,” (i.e., as if they were made between
distinct entities).34 Establishing free market equivalents for
intra-firm transactions is difficult in practice, and such transfer-pricing rules are amongst the most complex and controver-

25. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 23, arts. 4(1) & (3).
26. Id., art. 4(2).
27. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 100 01.
28. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 23, art. 5.
29. Id.
30. C. John Taylor, Twilight of the Neanderthals, or are Bilateral Double
Taxation Treaty Networks Sustainable, 34 MELB. U. L. REV. 268, 271 (2010).
31. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 23, art. 6.
32. Id. art. 12.
33. Id. art. 7.
34. AVI-YONAH, supra note 21, at 6 7.
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sial aspects of international tax law.35 Finally, for some types of
income, such as taxes on dividends and interests, taxation
rights are shared between the source and the residence country.36 The latter will then credit or exempt taxes already paid
at the source to avoid double taxation.
Although the primary purpose of DTTs is to prevent taxing
the same income twice, the treaties also contain a limited set of
broader taxation principles. One of them is the principle of nondiscrimination, which guarantees that the source state cannot
subject nationals of another contracting party to more burdensome taxation than its own nationals.37 DTTs thus contain a
form of national treatment standard similar to what is found in
other international economic law fields.38 In contrast to trade
and investment treaties, however, DTTs generally do not provide for most favored nation treatment.39 Source states can
thus treat foreign nationals from one DTT party better than
those of another DTT party. Finally, DTTs also tend to contain
basic rules to prevent tax evasion through the exchange of taxation information and assistance in the collection of taxes.40
B. Procedural Tax Norms: Inter-State Enforcement
The enforcement structure of DTTs is rudimentary compared
to international trade and investment treaties. DTTs resolve
disputes by inter-state consultations through a so-called mutual agreement procedure (MAP). Several more recent DTTs additionally provide for arbitration. Taxpayers can also pursue
their claims in domestic courts.41
35. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 69.
36. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 23, arts. 10 & 11.
37. Id. art. 24.
38. For distinctions between non-discrimination in tax and in trade law,
see Michael Lennard, The GATT 1994 and Direct Taxes: Some National
Treatment and Related Issues, in WTO AND DIRECT TAXATION 73, 96 99 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2005); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 104 (arguing that the national treatment obligation in DTTs is weaker than in BITs or
in the GATT as it is difficult to enforce it).
39. The GATT 1994 and Direct Taxes: Some National Treatment and Related Issues, supra note 38, at 98 99; RIXEN, supra note 17, at 74, 93 94 (citing deliberations at the League of Nations to explicit reject such clauses in
DTTs to preserve the reciprocal character of concessions).
40. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 23, arts. 26 & 27.
41. While this does not preclude a MAP, a court decision bars a subsequent
arbitration claim, see id. art. 25(5).
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The MAP is an intergovernmental process involving the competent tax authorities of the contracting states.42 Taxpayers
suffering from double taxation or other treatment inconsistent
with the DTT can initiate the MAP, but they are not directly
involved in the remainder of the proceedings, which take place
behind closed doors.43 The contracting parties are not obliged to
come to an agreement, but in practice they overwhelmingly
do.44 The process is a political rather than legal one.45 Aside
from solving individual grievances brought by taxpayers, the
MAP also serves as a vehicle to monitor, interpret, and, if necessary, adjust the DTT over time.46
Recent DTTs, particularly those concluded by the United
States, have gone a step further towards greater legalization by
providing for an arbitration procedure in cases where the competent authorities fail to reach an agreement.47 Again, individual taxpayers can initiate the procedure, but are not involved
directly.48 The 2017 version of the OECD Model Convention is
silent on the arbitration procedure, but most treaties, including
the MLI, follow the model of final-offer arbitration, also known
as “baseball arbitration,” in which arbitrators side with the position advanced by either of the competent state authorities
without providing reasons and without citing legal authorities.49 The arbitration decision is binding on the contracting
states, but they can mutually agree on an alternative solution.50 Moreover, the affected taxpayer can reject the arbitration outcome.51
Overall, the enforcement structure of DTTs is thus relatively
rudimentary. One explanation for this is that the allocation of
42. Id. art. 25.
43. SOL PICCIOTTO, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION 291 92 (1992).
44. Id. at 287.
45. Id. at 291.
46. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 74, 174; Id. at 295 99.
47. Hans Mooij, Tax Treaty Arbitration, 35 ARBITR. INT’L., 195, 195 (2018);
see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, A Global Treaty Override? The
New OECD Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Limits, 39 MICH. J. INT’L L.,
155, 159 (2018) (stating that most DTTs do not provide for arbitration).
48. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 23, art. 25(5).
49. Mooij, supra note 47, at 214; Joost Pauwelyn, Baseball Arbitration to
Resolve International Law Disputes: Hit or Miss?, 22 FLA. TAX REV. 40, 46 47
(2018).
50. OECD Model Tax Convention, supra note 23, art. 25(5).
51. Id.
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taxation rights is partially self-enforcing.52 States with large
amounts of reciprocal investment flows are both residence and
source states simultaneously, and consequently have little interest in prioritizing one over the other. Compliance with tax
treaties is therefore generally high.53 Furthermore, all states
provide at least partial unilateral tax relief to their companies
in addition to DTTs, indicating that they consider the prevention of double taxation to be in their interest even if that means
foregoing tax revenue.54 The political economy of double taxation avoidance thus does not give rise to the type of enforcement problems present in international investment law.
II. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS
IIAs protect foreign investment against undue governmental
interference by imposing protective obligations on host states,
which can be directly enforced by foreign investors through international investment arbitration. This potent and frequentlyused enforcement mechanism makes investment law one of the
most dynamic, but also most controversial, fields of international law.
A. Substantive Investment Norms: Protecting Investment
IIAs protect foreign investment against different types of undue regulatory interference by the host state.55 First, they prohibit the host state from discriminating against foreign investment relative to national investment (“national treatment”), and they forbid discriminating against foreign investments from different countries (“most favored nation treatment”).56 Second, they oblige states to provide a minimum
52. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 41, 168, 173 74.
53. Id. at 173.
54. Id. at 157 58 (arguing that effective lobbying by businesses is partially
responsible for states’ preferences to avoid double taxation).
55. There is no regularly updated model convention in international investment law that is as widely accepted as the OECD Model Convention in
tax. Hence, this section will provide examples from the 2012 national model
BIT of the United States.
56. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF [COUNTRY]
CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND RECIPROCAL PROTECTION OF
INVESTMENT
(2012),
arts.
2
&
3,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.
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standard of treatment for investment, which typically includes
protection from arbitrary or unjust action (“fair and equitable
treatment”) and from physical interference (“full protection and
security”).57 Third, they ensure that property can only be taken,
directly or indirectly, against the payment of full and prompt
compensation (“expropriation”).58 Fourth, they guarantee investors the ability to move and repatriate capital (“transfer of
funds”).59 Finally, some IIAs limit the ability of host states to
impose restrictions on the conduct and management of business operations (e.g., prohibiting “performance requirements”
and nationality-based limitations on the appointment of “senior
management and boards of directors”).60
These protective standards have given rise to varying judicial
interpretations.61 In practice, a multitude of governmental acts
and omissions can have an impact on foreign investment. The
question then arises: what conduct is a legitimate exercise of a
state’s regulatory prerogatives, and what amounts to an illegitimate interference with investment in violation of the treaty?62
Whereas early investment agreements only contained broadly-

pdf. Some treaties extend the non-discrimination obligations to the treatment
of the “investors” in addition to the “investment.”
57. See, e.g., id. art. 5.
58. See, e.g., id. art. 6.
59. See, e.g., id. art. 7.
60. See, e.g., id. arts. 8 & 9.
61. Franck, supra note 5. For inconsistent arbitral decisions, compare, for
instance, (1) on the notion of investment between the award and annulment
decision in Mr. Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID
Case No. ARB/99/7 (Feb. 9, 2004) (disagreeing on whether a contribution to
the host state’s development is required to count as an “investment”); (2) on
the reading of umbrella clauses SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v.
Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004) and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13
(Oct. 16, 2002) (disagreeing on whether an umbrella clause converts contractual breaches into violations of the BIT); and (3) the interpretation of the necessity defense LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., and LG&E International, Inc .v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (July 25, 2007) and
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8
(May 12, 2005) (on the conditions and application of the exception in the USArgentina BIT Art. XI).
62. See generally Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between
Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L.
507 (2009).
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worded protective principles,63 case law and an evolving treaty
practice have sought to draw clearer lines between investment
protection and the host state’s right to regulate. Tribunals have
developed new normative theories to translate vague principles
into operational standards, and they have drawn from customary international law (e.g., a state’s police power to regulate in
the public interest) to delineate protective standards.64 Recent
investment treaties have added clarifying language to further
circumscribe the scope of primary obligations and provided for
explicit policy safeguards, exceptions, and flexibilities.65 In
spite of this evolving case law and the trend towards greater
precision in treaty language, the line between permissible and
impermissible host state conduct remains blurry, as fundamental interpretive questions, such as the scope of protective obligations and the role and effect of exceptions, remain unresolved.66

63. The obligation to provide “fair and equitable treatment” illustrates this
point. As the Saluka tribunal stated: “The ordinary meaning’ of the fair and
equitable treatment’ standard can only be defined by terms of almost equal
vagueness.” Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial
Award, Mar. 17, 2006, ¶ 297. See, similarly, Joseph C. Lemire v. Ukraine,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 21 January 2010, ¶ 258; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/20, Award, Dec. 11, 2013, ¶ 504.
64. The concept of investor’s “legitimate expectations” proved to be one of
the most controversial judicial developments, see Michele Potesta, Legitimate
Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the Roots and the
Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88 (2013). Tribunals also
read flexibilities into vaguely worded standards, see, e.g., Methanex v. United
States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, Aug. 3, 2005,
Part IV, Chapter D, ¶ 7, or Saluka Investments, supra note 63, at ¶ 262.
65. Spears, supra note 5; Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through Greater Precision in Investment Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and
TTIP, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27 (2016); Mark S. Manger & Clint Peinhardt,
Learning and the Precision of International Investment Agreements, 43 INT’L
INTERACT. 1 (2017).
66. Federico Ortino, Refining the Content and Role of Investment ‘Rules’
and ‘Standards’: A New Approach to International Investment Treaty Making,
28 ICSID REV. 152 (2013); Federico Ortino, The Obligation of Regulatory Stability in the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: How Far Have We
Come?, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 845 (2018); Caroline Henckels, Scope Limitation
or Affirmative Defense? The Purpose and Role of Investment Treaty Exception
Clauses, in EXCEPTIONS AND DEFENSES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lorand Bartels
& Federica Paddeu eds., 2018).
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Aside from protecting investment, an increasing number of
IIAs also address other aspects of international investment relations. Some treaties contain explicit rules on the liberalization of investment flows67 or enshrine specific investment promotion or facilitation agendas.68 Recent investment treaties
also purport to discipline the conduct of foreign investors, but
thus far this has primarily taken the form of hortatory language promoting corporate social responsibility standards.69
Other public policy considerations connected to foreign investment, such as the fight against corruption70 or the preservation
of the environment,71 are also increasingly prominent features
in investment agreements.
B. Procedural Investment Norms: Investment Arbitration
International investment law, however, is most (in)famous
for its potent ISDS mechanism. The majority of IIAs allow private investors to bring treaty violation claims directly against
the host state to international arbitration.72 Investment arbitration tribunals can award monetary damages to investors
that may amount to billions of U.S. dollars. Although IIAs also
contain provisions on inter-state consultation and arbitration,
67. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can. EU,
Oct. 30, 2016, O.J. (L 11) 23, art. 8.4.
68. See, for instance, the new Brazilian BITs, Vivian Gabriel, The New
Brazilian Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement: An Analysis of
the Conflict Resolution Mechanism in Light of the Theory of the Shadow of the
Law, 34 CONFL. RESOLUT. Q. 141 (2016); C. Titi, International Investment
Law and the Protection of Foreign Investment in Brazil, 13 TRANSNATL.
DISPUTE MANAG. 1, 8 (2016).
69. See, e.g., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership,
art.
9.17,
Mar.
8,
2018,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/Comprehensive-and-ProgressiveAgreement-for-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-English.pdf
[hereinafter
CPTPP].
70. Joost Pauwelyn, Different Means, Same End: The Contribution of
Trade and Investment Treaties to Anti–Corruption Policy, in ANTICORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE?
1 18 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 2013).
71. Wolfgang Alschner & Elizabeth Tuerk, The Role of International Investment Agreements in Fostering Sustainable Development, SSRN
ELECTRONIC LIBRARY (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2295440.
72. The IIA contains a unilateral offer of consent to arbitration, which is
perfected when the investor initiates a claim. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration
Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 232 (1995).
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compared to ISDS claims whose numbers have risen to more
than nine hundred,73 inter-state arbitration is rarely used.74
Historically, investment treaties began including this potent
enforcement mechanism to deal with a dual asymmetry. A first
asymmetry between powerful capital exporting and poorer capital importing countries in the early 20th century turned investment disputes into armed conflicts (“gunboat diplomacy”).75
ISDS was meant to prevent such escalation by removing investment disputes from the inter-state sphere (“depoliticization”).76 A second asymmetry existed between investors and
host states. Once a factory or mine was built and the capital
was sunk, investors were at the whims of a host state and its
legal system.77 ISDS sought to level the playing field by lifting
investment disputes from the domestic to the international
sphere (“internationalization”).78 For these historical reasons,
international investment law is among the few international
73. These statistics are based on UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub in
December 2018, see UNCTAD, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator,
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
74. Michele Potestà, State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is There Potential?, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 753 68 (Nerina Boschiero et al.
eds., 2013).
75. Wealthy industrialized states thereby sought to protect the capital of
their nationals abroad from unfavorable governmental interventions by
threating the use of force and by sending warships to project their power,
especially vis-à-vis the newly independent states of South America. See Jonathan Gimblett & O.Thomas Johnson, Jr., From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of modern International Investment Law, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 649, 651 664 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2011).
76. Id.; see also Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in
Contemporary Investor-State Arbitration, SSRN ELECTRONIC LIBRARY (2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1716833.
77. Formally, this is conceived of as a “time inconsistency problem,”
whereby the host state promises protection to attract investment but has an
incentive to renege on that promise once the investment is made. The investor, anticipating such reneging, may then not invest in the first place. BITs
are said to solve that problem by making the host state’s promise of protection credible, see Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt
Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J.
INT’L L. 639, 58 66 (1997).
78. Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 369 (2003)
(“Arbitration was justified as a way to level the playing field and to reduce
the prospect of host state home town justice,’ thereby safeguarding assets
from expropriation without compensation.”).
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regimes that provides private actors with direct access to international dispute settlement for public international law
claims.
International arbitration conventions support treaty-based
investment arbitration. Enforcement of investment arbitration
awards either takes place under the framework of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention (“ICSID Convention”) or as ad hoc arbitration under the
framework of the New York Convention, which also governs
international commercial arbitral awards.79 Review and enforcement mechanisms differ between the two routes. ICSID
awards are reviewed on limited grounds by special ad hoc annulment committees, and the awards are treated as if they
were the final judgments of the highest court of the state of enforcement.80 The New York Convention, in contrast, relies on
domestic courts for review and enforcement.81 Neither system,
however, allows a full appeal, hence awards are not scrutinized
for substantive correctness.82
IIAs, in concert with the respective institutional arbitration
rules, determine the scope and procedure of the arbitration.
Early IIAs only provided for rudimentary arbitration rules; recent BITs, however, often devote half of their treaty text to
ISDS.83 Moreover, institutional arbitration rules, such as those
applicable to ICSID arbitration or ad hoc arbitration under
UNCITRAL rules, have been revised over time.84 These chang79. Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards under the
ICSID and New York Conventions, 28 N. Y. UNIV. J. INT’L L. POLIT. 175
(1995).
80. Aron Broches, Awards Rendered Pursuant to the ICSID Convention:
Binding Force, Finality, Recognition, Enforcement, Execution, 2 FOREIGN
INVEST. L. J. 287 (1987).
81. Choi, supra note 79.
82. David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal, 7
FOREIGN INVEST. L. J. 21 (1992); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Appeal and Judicial Review in International Arbitration: The Case of the WTO Appellate Review, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
245 80 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997) (contrasting review in investment to a WTO appeal).
83. Compare, for instance, the Canada-Argentina BIT (1991) Article 10 on
ISDS with the Canada-Tanzania BIT (2013), devoting Articles 19 35 to ISDS.
84. Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 L. BUS. REV. AM. 885 (2007).
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es responded to successive waves of criticism directed against
ISDS. A first wave of criticism starting in the early 2000s related to the secrecy and lack of public participation in investment arbitration.85 Recent treaties and arbitration rules mandate the publication of awards, public hearings, and allow for
amicus curiae submissions.86
A second, more recent wave of criticism has focused on perceived conflicts of interest of investment arbitrators. These conflicts may arise from “double hatting,” where arbitrators also
act as counsel or expert witnesses in other proceedings, or they
result from perceived biases in connection with an arbitrator’s
financial interest in reappointments.87 To respond to these concerns, recent investment treaties have included ethical codes
for arbitrators and tightened appointment rules.88 As discussed
further below, ISDS remains controversial despite these incremental adjustments, and it continues to be at the center of the
investment regime’s current legitimacy crisis.
III. NATURAL COMPARATORS: THE TAX AND INVESTMENT
REGIMES
International economic law scholarship increasingly deploys
a comparative international law perspective to study similarities and differences among its sub-disciplines. Most such studies, however, focus on comparing international trade and in-

85. Jack J. Coe Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes – Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 UNIV. KANS. L.
REV. 1339, 1339 (2005); J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural
Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus
Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L. J. 681, 695 (2007).
86. Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in Third-Party Participation, 29
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 200, 201 (2011).
87. See generally, Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar H. Lie, The
Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L.
301 (2017); for a general public law critique, see GUS VAN HARTEN,
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007); Pia Eberhardt &
Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Financiers are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, CORP. EUR.
OBSERVATORY
(2012),
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-frominjustice.pdf.
88. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 69, art. 9.22(6).
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vestment law.89 The trade and investment regimes share key
norms, such as the national treatment and most favored nation
principles,90 possess active dispute settlement arms that, at
times, involve related disputes,91 encounter similar interpretive
issues,92 occasionally cite jurisprudence from the other field,93
and are increasingly found in the same treaty instruments.94
International tax law, in contrast, deals with distinct legal issues, consists of mostly dissimilar norms, and relies primarily
on political rather than judicial forms of dispute settlement.95
Even the nascent tax arbitration bears little resemblance to
trade and investment adjudication since its arbitrators merely
side with one of the positions advanced by the disputing parties
without providing reasons or citing legal authorities.96 Unsurprisingly then, scholarship contrasting tax and trade97 or investment and tax has been rare.98 Yet, tax and investment law
89. See, e.g., Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in
Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2008); Tomer Broude, Investment and Trade: the “Lottie and Lisa” of International Economic Law?, 8 TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT.
TDM (2011); JÜRGEN KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW:
CONVERGING SYSTEMS (2016).
90. See generally, Jürgen Kurtz, The MFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An Uneasy Fit?, 5 J. WORLD INVEST. TRADE 861 (2004); DiMascio and
Pauwelyn, supra note 90.
91. See generally, Joost Pauwelyn, Editorial Comment: Adding Sweeteners
to Softwood Lumber: the WTO–NAFTA ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 197 (2006); Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts,
57 HARV. INT’L L. J. 383, 399 (2016).
92. J. Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration:
Competition and its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 749, 756 (2009).
93. See generally, Damien Charlotin, The Place of Investment Awards and
WTO Decisions in International Law: A Citation Analysis, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L.
279 (2017).
94. Roger P. Alford, The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration, 12 ST. CLARA J. INT’L L. 35, 38 40 (2014).
95. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 74.
96. Mooij, supra note 47; PAUWELYN, supra note 49.
97. Yariv Brauner, International Trade and Tax Agreements May Be Coordinated, but Not Reconciled, 25 VA. TAX REV. 251 (2005); Horst Raff, Preferential Trade Agreements and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment, 88
J. PUBLIC ECON. 2745 (2004); Joel Slemrod & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, (How)
Should Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues, 55 TAX L. REV. 533
(2001); The GATT 1994 and Direct Taxes: Some National Treatment and Related Issues, supra note 38.
98. Asif H. Qureshi, Coherence in the Public International Law of Taxation: Developments in International Taxation and Trade and Investment Re-
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are, in fact, strikingly similar in some respects. This section
shows that there are important similarities between the policy
rationales, structure, and historical evolution of the tax and
investment regimes. These similarities make tax and investment law natural and highly insightful comparators.
A. Common Policy Goals
As recently as 2011, the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) consistently referred to both
DTTs and BITs as “international investment agreements,” and
grouped them under the umbrella of a single regime for the facilitation, promotion, and protection of foreign direct investment.99 Similarly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
referred to DTTs as “Bilateral Investment Treaties for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation.”100 Upon reflection, this conflation of BITs and DTTs is not surprising given that tax and investment treaties share a common policy goal: facilitating the
free flow of international capital.101
Would-be capital exporters face two sets of political risks in
the host state that are respectively addressed through DTTs
and BITs. First, companies investing abroad fear that their
revenues could be detrimentally affected by fiscal measures.
Their income could be taxed twice: once by the company’s home
lated Taxation, 10 ASIAN J. WTO INT’L HEALTH L. POL’Y 193 (2015); Lazo et
al., supra note 3; Chaisse, supra note 3.
99. The WIR 2005, for instance, explained that international investment
agreements “include[s] bilateral treaties for the promotion and protection of
investment (or bilateral investment treaties), treaties for the avoidance of
double taxation (or double taxation treaties), other bilateral and regional
trade and investment agreements as well as various multilateral agreements
that contain a commitment to liberalize, protect and/or promote investment.”
See UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporation
and the Internationalization of R&D, at 37, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2005
(2005).
100. WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review East African Community, Annex
2
Tanzania,
WT/TPR/S/171/TZA,
Sept.
20,
2006,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s171-02_e.doc.
101. THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS,
xxvii (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). While this section focuses
on their common economic goals, it should also be pointed out that both types
of instruments were also seen and originally conceived of as pillars for stable,
rule-based international relations and world peace. See Christians, supra
note 13, at 9; Gimblett &Johnson, Jr., supra note 75.
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state and a second time by the company’s host state where the
revenue is generated.102 DTTs solve that problem by allocating
taxation authority between the residence and the source country, thereby ensuring that the same income is not taxed
twice.103
Second, companies considering investing abroad also fear
detrimental regulatory measures in host states.104 A host state
may decide to expropriate foreign assets or discriminate
against foreign investors. The laws and courts of the host state
may be perceived to not offer reliable protection against these
risks, as the former can be changed and the latter may be biased, inefficient, or lacking expertise, which compounds the
risks that the investor faces.105 BITs protect foreign investments from such political risks by creating immutable international legal obligations that are directly enforceable by foreign
investors through international arbitration.106 The division of
labor between DTTs and BITs to deal with political risks arising from fiscal and regulatory measures, respectively, is apparent in the treaties themselves: BITs have historically carved
out taxation from the treaty’s scope and left it instead to parallel DTTs to address fiscal measures.107
A second division of labor underscores the complementarity
between tax and investment treaties. DTTs deal with the upside of investment relations by determining how the gains from
investment should be distributed. DTTs allocate taxation rights
and thereby determine what share of the generated revenue is
taxed in the source country, what share is taxed by the resi102. Ke Chin Wang, International Double Taxation of Income: Relief
Through International Agreement 1921–1945, 59 HARV. L. REV. 73, 73 (1945)
(explaining the distinction between residence and source countries).
103. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 100 01.
104. Hermann Abs & Hartley Shawcross, The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment-Introduction, 9 J. PUB. L. 115, 119 (1960).
105. Jan Paulsson, Third World Participation in International Investment
Arbitration, 2 FOREIGN INVEST. L. J. 19, 63 (1987); Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2 TRADE L. DEV. 19,
33 35 (2010) (for a critical discussion).
106. Jürgen Voss, The Protection and Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31
INT’L COMP. L. Q. 686, 705 08 (1982).
107. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, at 33, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/TDR/(2000) (2000). More recent investment treaties, however, cover taxation issues in more detail. See generally, M. Davie, Taxation-Based
Investment Treaty Claims, 6 J. INT’L DISP. SETTL. 202 (2015).
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dence country, and what share remains with the investor (i.e.,
is not deducted as taxes at all). BITs, conversely, deal with the
downside of investment by allocating how the losses from investment should be distributed. BITs determine what losses
are compensable (e.g., losses arising from a treaty breach) and
thus borne by the host state, and what losses are noncompensable and thus borne by the investor (e.g., losses arising
from pure commercial risks).108 An UNCTAD study summarized this complementarity as follows: “[t]he principal purpose
of DTTs is to deal with issues arising out of the allocation of
revenues between countries; the principal purpose of BITs is to
protect the investments that generate these revenues.”109
Finally, both types of agreements complement each other
when it comes to compensating for weak domestic institutions.
As Charles Irish writes, “foreign investors generally view the
tax systems of developing countries as less stable than the systems of their home countries,” and therefore ask for DTTs to
ensure fair tax treatment.110 The conclusion of BITs has similarly been motivated by fears of bias in domestic courts and arbitrary changes to local laws in developing states; these fears
have induced investors to rely on international rules and institutions instead.111 States, particularly those with weaker domestic institutions, have also used BITs and DTTs to signal a
favorable investment climate with attendant hopes of attracting more foreign investment and gaining an upper hand in the
international competition for foreign capital.112 In short, tax
108. Wolfgang Alschner, Aligning Loss and Liability – Towards an Integrated Assessment of Damages in Investment Arbitration, in THE USE OF
ECONOMICS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE DISPUTES: LESSONS LEARNED AND
CHALLENGES AHEAD (Theresa Carpenter, Marion Jansen, & Joost Pauwelyn
eds., 2017).
109. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, supra note 107, at 27.
110. Charles R. Irish, International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation at Source, INT’L COMP. L. Q. 292, 302 (1974).
111. Prosper Weil, The State, the Foreign Investor, and International Law:
The No Longer Stormy Relationship of a Ménage À Trois, 15 ICSID REV. 401,
402 05 (2000); Van Harten, supra note 105.
112. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Competing
for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60
INT’L ORGAN. 811, 819 27 (2006) (on BITs); Fabian Barthel & Eric Neumayer,
Competing for Scarce Foreign Capital: Spatial Dependence in the Diffusion of
Double Taxation Treaties, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 645 (2012) (on DTTs); see also
Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 106.
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and investment treaties pursue the same goal of facilitating
international investment, but through complementary means.
B. Common Roots and Similar Codification Efforts
In addition to pursuing common goals, both regimes share
common historical roots. Origins of both regimes can be traced
back to the bilateral treaties of the nineteenth century, including Friendship, Navigation and Commerce (FCN) agreements
covering both tax and foreign property.113 Early multilateral
efforts to codify disciplines governing states’ economic relations, including on taxation and foreign investment protection,
followed with the work of the League of Nations in the interwar period.114 Article 23(e) of the 1920 League of Nations Covenant provided the organization with the task “to secure and
maintain . . . equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the League.”115 This clause sparked international codification efforts, which bore fruit in the 1929 Draft Convention on
the Treatment of Foreigners that jointly dealt with the property protection (Article 11) and fiscal treatment (Articles 12 14)
of aliens.116 Disagreement amongst states, however, prevented
the Draft Convention from ever becoming law.117
Such failed multilateralization attempts are another point
that both regimes have in common. International organizations
repeatedly pushed for the coordination of international taxation and investment protection through multilateral rules, but
pushback from states led to the realization that a common mul-

113. On investment treaties, see Abs & Shawcross, supra note 104; Wolfgang Alschner, Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaties on Modern Investment Treaty
Law, 5 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 455, 461 63 (2013); on tax treaties, see Lara
Friedlander & Scott Wilkie, Policy Forum: The History of Tax Treaty Provisions — And Why It Is Important To Know About It, 54 CAN. TAX J. 907, 909
(2013).
114. See generally, SUNITA JOGARAJAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE LEAGUE
OF NATIONS (2018); Mona Pinchis, The Ancestry of ‘Equitable Treatment’ in
Trade: Lessons from the League of Nations during the Inter-War Period, 15 J.
WORLD INVEST. & TRADE 13 (2014); RIXEN, supra note 17, at 87 93.
115. League of Nations Covenant art. 23(e).
116. International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners, League of
Nations Doc. C.36. M.21. 1929. II, 1929.
117. John Ward Cutler, The Treatment of Foreigners: In Relation to the
Draft Convention and Conference of 1929, 27 AM. J. INT’L L. 225 (1933).
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tilateral framework was out of reach.118 After the first multilateralization efforts failed under the auspices of the League of
Nations during the inter-war period, the taxation and investment protection dossiers passed to the OECD after the Second
World War.119 The 1960s then saw renewed efforts to multilateralize the investment and tax architecture under the leadership of the OECD.120 Revealing the striking parallels of the two
fields, the OECD published in quick succession a Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property in 1962 and a
Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital in
1963.121 Yet again, disagreement amongst states prevented either draft from becoming a multilateral treaty.122
In both cases, however, the OECD salvaged the work by recommending the Draft Conventions be used as models for future
bilateral treaties, setting the stage for the bilateral governance
structure that came to dominate both regimes. In July 1963,
the OECD Council adopted a resolution calling on its members
to conform their bilateral tax treaty practice to the OECD Double Taxation Draft Convention.123 A similar OECD Council decision followed in October 1967, recommending the Draft Convention on Foreign Property Protection as the basis for bilateral investment agreements.124

118. See, e.g., MICHAEL KOBETSKY, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENTS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 158 (2011) (ebook); Muchlinski, supra note 9.
119. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 96 97.
120. Id. at 97; STEPHAN W. SCHILL, THE MULTILATERALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 36 (2009).
121. See M. J. Van Emde Boas, The O.E.C.D. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 1 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 265 (1963); see generally Adrian A. Kragen, Double Income Taxation Treaties: The OECD Draft, 52
CAL REV 306 (1964).
122. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 97; SCHILL, supra note 120, at 36 38.
123. OECD, Recommendation on the Draft Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (adopted July
30,
1963),
OECD/LEGAL/0056,
available
at
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/405/405.en.pdf.
124. OECD, Resolution on Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property (adopted Oct. 12, 1967) OECD Pub. 15637, available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/39286571.pd
f.
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C. Common Bilateral Governance Structure
Following the work of the OECD in the 1960s, the tax and investment regimes evolved into two global but decentralized
networks of mostly bilateral treaties. Bilateralism thus became
the common, defining structural feature of the tax and investment regimes. This distinguishes them from the international
trade regime, which developed around the common multilateral
rulebook of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and later WTO.125
The tax and investment regimes each number around three
thousand mostly bilateral agreements today.126 Between the
1960s and 1980s, tax and investment treaties gradually grew
in numbers, and in the 1990s and early 2000s their numbers
expanded particularly rapidly (Figure 1). For most of this period, DTTs and BITs closely trailed each other. Over the past
decade, however, the growth of IIAs, which includes both BITs
and investment chapters in free trade agreements, has slowed
down considerably, whereas the number of DTTs has continued
to increase relatively steadily.

125. While WTO members can use free trade agreements to liberalize their
trade further and broaden their commercial cooperation to areas not covered
by the WTO, they cannot bilaterally contract out of their multilateral obligations.
126. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 108. Numbers of DTTs are based on the
OECD’s Exchange of Tax Information Portal, http://eoi-tax.org. Numbers for
IIAs are based on UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Hub in December 2018, see
UNCTAD
INVESTMENT
POLICY
HUB,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements
(last visited Dec. 14, 2018); see also UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2019:
Special Economic Zones, 99, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2019 (2019).
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Figure 1: The parallel expansion of the tax and investment regimes
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The two treaty networks are different in some respects.
Whereas BITs connect primarily developed and developing
countries, DTTs link all major developed countries.127 In 2002,
there were roughly equal numbers of DTTs and BITs in existence, yet while the former were estimated to cover eighty-eight
percent of world foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, the latter only protected seven percent.128 These differences have become less pronounced over time, though. DTTs connected
OECD countries, but then also spread to developing countries.129 Conversely, whereas investment agreements proliferated first in North-South relations, today they also connect developed countries in the form of investment chapters in larger
free trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) or the Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada.130
Hence, the coverage of IIAs and DTTs is converging.
127. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 111 15.; PICCIOTTO, supra note 43, at 54.
128. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development, 89, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 (2003).
129. See infra Part III.D.
130. Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration under
NAFTA Focus: Emerging the for International Litigation (Part 1), 43 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 531, 537 38 (2002); MARC BUNGENBERG ET AL., SECOND THOUGHTS:
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Although tax and investment law developed around distinct
bilateral treaties, their networks were never completely decentralized. Unifying norms, principles, and institutions bound the
individual bilateral treaties in each field together. The text
that emerged from the two OECD Draft Conventions of the
1960s provided tax and investment lawyers with a common
language that was reproduced in subsequent DTTs and BITs,
respectively, and contributed to the emergence of shared norms
and principles within each field.131 On the institutional side,
the creation of ICSID in 1965 provided a multilateral framework for settling disputes in the investment field.132 Similarly,
in tax, the OECD and its inter-governmental Fiscal Committee
became a fixed venue for international deliberations on tax
governance and regularly updated the OECD Model text and
its commentary.133 In sum, common norms, principles, and institutions created a level of cohesion that justifies calling each
formally decentralized treaty network an “international regime.”134 Yet, particularly as compared to the multilateral trading system, this label should not obscure the fact that the international tax and investment system remained decentralized
and lacked a formal, comprehensive multilateral superstructure.
As they are based on decentralized networks of mostly bilateral treaties, the tax and investment regimes have come to face
common governance challenges. In both spheres, states have to
comply with rules and commitments across dozens of treaties
that may be similar in overall design but often differ significantly in their fine print.135 Aside from such normative frag-

INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED DEMOCRACIES (Armand De
Mestral ed., 2017).
131. SCHILL, supra note 120, at 39; RIXEN, supra note 17, at 66; Yariv
Brauner, Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS, 41 BROOK. J. INT’L L., 973, 977
(2016).
132. Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos: Foreign Investment Law as a
Complex Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29
ICSID REV. 372, 393 94 (2014).
133. Genschel & Rixen, supra note 4, at 160.
134. J. W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 427, 431 (2010); Christians, supra note 13; AVI-YONAH, supra note
21, at 3.
135. Nathalie Bravo, The Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Relationship
with Tax Treaties, 8 WORLD TAX J. 279, 281 (2016); Wolfgang Alschner &
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mentation, states also grapple with normative modernization.
DTTs and BITs have been concluded over multiple decades. As
rules evolve, states must find efficient ways to update existing
agreements.136 Hence, the similar decentralized structure of
bilateral treaty networks exposes the tax and investment regimes to comparable governance challenges. This article will
return to these issues in the context of recent reform efforts in
both fields.
D. Similar Policy Diffusion to Developing Countries
The commonalities between the tax and investment regimes
also extend to the process by which treaties spread across the
globe. In the 1960s, it was not at all clear whether DTTs and
BITs would become global networks; much depended on whether newly decolonized developing countries would accept an
agenda hitherto primarily shaped by industrialized nations in
the OECD.
Even though both types of agreements are de jure reciprocal,
de facto the advantages and burdens associated with them
strongly depend on the underlying capital flows.137 Absent a
DTT or BIT, a host country to a foreign investor can tax and
regulate largely at will.138 DTTs curtail the right to tax income
sourced in the host country, while BITs curtail the right to regulate activities taking place in the host country. When bilateral
capital flows are symmetrical, these fiscal and regulatory limitations are reciprocated by each contracting state. But if capital
flows are starkly asymmetrical, the capital importer de facto
bears a higher compliance burden than the capital exporter.139
For instance, while German companies have invested in Ivory
Coast, companies from Ivory Coast have not invested in GerDmitriy Skougarevskiy, Mapping the Universe of International Investment
Agreements, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 561 (2016).
136. Taylor, supra note 30, at 297 306; UNCTAD, Lessons from the MAI,
supra note 9.
137. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 100.
138. It will, of course, face some constraints by customary international law
and its minimum standard for the treatment of aliens.
139. Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24
INT’L LAW. 655, 663 64 (1990); José E. Alvarez, The Evolving BIT, 7
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 3 (2010); TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX
POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 3 (2018).
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many.140 In the absence of foreign investors, Germany’s regulatory and source taxation policy is de facto unrestrained by the
BIT (1966) and DTT (1982) concluded with Ivory Coast, whereas Ivory Coast has to limit its regulatory and source taxation
prerogatives vis-à-vis German investors. Hence, even though
treaty obligations are reciprocal de jure, both DTTs and BITs
de facto place a greater compliance burden on the capital importing country in bilateral relationships characterized by
asymmetrical capital flows.
Scholars of BITs and DTTs have thus been puzzled that both
types of agreements spread so successfully to developing countries. In 1997, Andrew Guzman asked why developing countries sign investment treaties that hurt them.141 Almost twenty
years earlier, Charles Irish asked the same question in relation
to DTTs: “why [were] unfavorable double taxation agreements
[ ] assumed by developing countries?”142 The answers scholars
have given as to why developing countries signed on to DTTs
that eroded their tax base and agreed to BITs that sacrificed
part of their regulatory autonomy mirror each other.
First, developing countries joined the bandwagon of BITs and
DTTs hoping to attract FDI. According to Guzman, the diffusion of BITs was driven by a competition for capital amongst
developing countries.143 Similarly, having a DTT was widely
seen by states as a precondition for attracting foreign investment and a means to gain an advantage over regional competitors.144 In hindsight, these expectations appear overly optimistic. Economic studies have thus far failed to conclusively establish a causal link between BITs or DTTs and increased investment flows.145
Second, in addition to overestimating the FDI-attracting effects of these treaties, developing countries also seemed to have
underappreciated their costs. As Lauge Poulsen shows for
BITs, developing countries long mistook investment treaties as
140. Based on the OECD International direct investment database until
2010 (last reported year).
141. Guzman, supra note 77.
142. Irish, supra note 110, at 300.
143. Guzman, supra note 77.
144. Irish, supra note 110, at 303; Barthel & Neumayer, supra note 112.
145. Guzman, supra note 77, at 370 71; see also Jeswald W. Salacuse &
Nicholas Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 111 (2005).
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mere pieces of paper or tokens of good will without appreciating the risks they posed in enabling foreign investors to sue
host states for millions of dollars in damages.146 Similarly,
Charles Irish notes that developing countries were typically
unaware of the negative consequences flowing from the allocation of taxation rights between the residence and the source
country in double taxation treaties.147
Third, a lack of expertise and sophistication on the part of
developing states seems to have fueled this double miscalculation and resulted in one-sided negotiations. In the context of
BITs, Poulsen shows how many developing countries signed on
to BITs with little or no meaningful negotiations.148 In the BIT
regime, developing countries tended to be rule-takers opting
into the model agreements proposed by their developed country
counterparts as rule-makers.149 In the same vein, Irish notes
that “new tax agreements are too often the product of unquestioned acceptance of the developed country’s position after little
or no substantive negotiation.”150 More recent qualitative and
econometric research by Martin Hearson confirms that many
developing states initially approached DTT negotiations with
relatively little sophistication and then learned over time, as
their experience grew, to negotiate more advantageous treaties.151 In short, the diffusion of DTTs and BITs bears striking
similarities.
E. Similar Contestation Efforts
Even though most states sooner or later bought into the treaty models put forth by developed countries, both fields also experienced periods of contestation that followed similar patterns.
146. LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ECONOMIC
DIPLOMACY: THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(2015).
147. Irish, supra note 110, at 300.
148. POULSEN, supra note 146.
149. Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 135, at 562; Todd Allee & Clint
Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1, 23 (2010).
150. Irish, supra note 110, at 300.
151. Martin Hearson, What Makes Countries Negotiate Away Their Corporate Tax Base? 21 (UN Uni. World Inst. For Dev. Econ. Res., Working Paper
No. 122, 2017).
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First, from the 1960s to the early 1980s, developing countries
used the United Nations (UN) to contest the taxation and investment protection norms forged by developed countries in the
OECD. In the context of investment, developing countries asserted sovereignty over their natural resources and sought to
limit the property rights of foreign investors in favor of statedriven economic development and industrial policy.152 This
New International Economic Order (NIEO) was formalized
through several UN General Assembly resolutions and draft
conventions in the 1960s and 70s, which, amongst others,
sought to challenge the standard of compensation for expropriation advanced by developed states.153 The texts stipulated that
compensation was to be appropriate (rather than full) and subject to review by domestic courts (rather than international tribunals).154 These efforts were a frontal attack against the expropriation norms advanced by developed countries, including
through the OECD Draft Convention.
In the realm of taxation, contestation followed similar arguments but took a different form. Increasingly conscious of the
fact that contemporary DTTs disadvantaged developing states
by effectively privileging the interests of the residence country
over the source country in asymmetric investment relations,
the UN set up an expert group in the 1970s to rebalance DTTs
in favor of developing countries.155 The work of the expert
group resulted in a new UN sponsored DTT model tailored to
the relationship between developed and developing countries
(“the UN Model”), which allocated more taxation rights to the
source country.156 Rather than challenge the status quo outright, the UN Model largely followed the OECD Model, but
modified it in key passages so as to allocate more taxable revenue to source countries.157 The contestation in both fields thus
followed similar patterns of using the UN to target perceived
152. Gimblett & Johnson, Jr., supra note 76, at 669 81.
153. Guzman, supra note 77.
154. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 52 (Dec. 12, 1974). See also, G.A. Res. 1803
(XVII), at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962).
155. Genschel & Rixen, supra note 4, at 161.
156. Jan de Goede & Wim Wijnen, The UN Model in practice 1997–2013, 68
BULL. INT’L TAX’N 118, 146 (2014).
157. Thomas Rixen, From Double Tax Avoidance to Tax Competition: Explaining the Institutional Trajectory of International Tax Governance, 18 REV.
INT’L POL. ECON. 197, 208 (2011).
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asymmetries in existing bilateral treaties, although the strategies differed in their fine print. While the response in taxation
was more measured and expert-driven, the reform sought with
respect to investment protection was more far-reaching and
political. This difference partially explains the varying success
of both strategies. Whereas the UN tax model was subsequently used in some North-South DTTs,158 the NIEO approach to
expropriation never took hold in BITs.159
A second more recent effort of parallel contestation did not
pit developing against developed countries, but multinational
companies against national taxpayers. This contestation has
led to a legitimacy crisis in both fields. In investment law, beginning in the 1990s, investors started using the long-dormant
investor-state arbitration clauses in IIAs to bring over nine
hundred claims against host states.160 Roughly half of all concluded claims have resulted in some kind of payout to the investor, either through a (often secret) settlement or a damage
award for the foreign investor.161 Some claims are perceived to
be particularly controversial, such as Philip Morris’ challenge
of Australia’s tobacco control legislation,162 and some award
values were particularly high, such as two awards rendered
against Ecuador163 and Venezuela164 of 1.8 and 1.6 billion dollars, respectively. These claims created a backlash against
ISDS and sparked a global debate over whether this special
form of protection for investors, which can entail significant
monetary transfers from taxpayers to companies, is justified.165

158. de Goede & Wijnen, supra note 156.
159. Guzman, supra note 77.
160. Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth Versus Reality, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2017).
161. Data based on the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute
Settlement
Navigator
(Feb.
2018),
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement.
162. Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia (H.K. v. Austl.),
PCA Case No. 2012-2 (2015).
163. Occidental Petroleum Corporation & Occidental Exploration & Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador (II), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 (Sept.
24, 2012).
164. Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., Mobil Corporation v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27
(Sept. 24, 2014).
165. Waibel et al., supra note 5.
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The rise of investor-state arbitration thus plunged the investment regime into what is widely perceived as a legitimacy
crisis.166 This has triggered a variety of policy responses from
system exit (e.g., Venezuela and Ecuador),167 to system redesign (e.g., Brazil),168 to a plethora of more or less ambitious reforms to national investment treaty programs169 turning the
world into a quasi-laboratory of investment law reform experiments.170 Starting in 2017, this global reform debate has been
lifted to the multilateral level, as state representatives have
begun to gather under the auspices of the UNCITRAL as Working Group III to debate the future of investor-state dispute settlement.171 Specifically, the mandate of Working Group III consists of (1) identifying concerns relating to ISDS, (2) considering whether reform is needed, and (3) developing reform options.172 As of this writing, Working Group III has affirmed
that the investment regime is in need of reform, and has proceeded to step three to consider viable reform proposals.173
In the tax domain, the rising problem of tax evasion and
avoidance similarly saw the interests of national taxpayers and
multinational companies clash, plunging the international taxation regime into a legitimacy crisis. Tax avoidance had occupied tax experts since the early days of the regime,174 but it re166. See Franck, supra note 5; Charles N. Brower & Stephen W. Schill, Is
Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment
Law Symposium: International Judges, 9 CHIC. J. INT’L L. 471, 471 76 (2008);
ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY (2017); Waibel et
al., supra note 5.
167. Frédéric G. Sourgens, Keep the Faith: Investment Protection Following
the Denunciation of International Investment Agreements, 11 ST. CLARA J.
INT’L L. 335, 360 61 (2013).
168. Gabriel, supra note 68; Titi, supra note 68.
169. Roberts, supra note 14.
170. Alschner, supra note 15.
171. Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of
Investor-State Arbitration, AM. J. INT’L L. 410, 426 27 (2018).
172. UNCITRAL, Annotated Provisional Agenda, Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform), Thirty-fourth session, ¶10, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.141, (Sept. 15, 2017).
173. Anthea Roberts, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Moving to Reform
Options
…
the
Process,
EJIL TALK!
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-moving-to-reform-optionsthe-process/.
174. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 120 22.
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mained an ancillary issue until the late 1980s, even though
DTTs were typically called treaties for “the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion”175 (not unlike BITs that were formally concerned with the “Promotion
and Protection of Investment”176 but focused almost exclusively
on the latter). Increased liberalization of capital flows coupled
with differing national taxation rates soon created incentives
for wealthy individuals, as well as companies, to engage in tax
planning to limit their exposure to domestic taxation.177 When
corporations shift revenue from high-tax to low- (or no) tax jurisdictions, they erode the tax base in high-tax jurisdictions,
deprive governments of revenue, and undermine the legitimacy
of the international tax system.178 International efforts to curb
harmful tax competition and tax planning began in earnest in
the mid-1990s under the auspices of the OECD,179 but it took
the 2008 economic and financial crisis to catapult the issue to
the top of the political agenda.180 This led, amongst other initiatives, to the MLI in 2018. The MLI represents the most significant multilateral attempt yet to consolidate new rules to protect taxpayers against abusive tax planning by multinational
companies.181
IV. COMMON STRUCTURAL CHALLENGE: SQUARING
BILATERALISM WITH MULTILATERALISM
This latest contestation that pitted the interests of taxpayers
against those of multinational companies not only triggered
ambitious efforts to reform both systems, but also exposed a
common structural tension that each field needed to resolve in
175. See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Canada for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gain, Canada-UK BTT, 3 CAN. TAX
REP. (CCH) 19,700 19,792 (1978) (emphasis added).
176. See, e.g., Canada-Argentina BIT (1993) (emphasis added).
177. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 117 18.
178. Brauner, supra note 131, at 976 (“The [BEPS] project was triggered by
public outrage over aggressive corporate tax planning and was fueled by the
media exposure of such schemes, which mandated the reform of the international tax regime.”).
179. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 132 38.
180. Sissie Fung, The Questionable Legitimacy of the OECD/G20 BEPS
Project, 10 ERASMUS L. REV. 76, 76 79 (2017).
181. Brauner, supra note 8.
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order to overcome its legitimacy crisis. On the one hand, a
massive renegotiation of thousands of existing treaties to address the legitimacy concerns of each regime through purely
bilateral reforms would be impractical, if not impossible. On
the other hand, states had consistently rebuked past attempts
at multilateralization and continued to show little willingness
to replace the existing bilateral governance structure with a
multilateral one. So, how were the investment and tax regimes
to square bilateralism with multilateralism in order to resolve
their legitimacy crises?
The structural tension between bilateralism and multilateralism in reforming tax and investment law can be further broken down into three dimensions relating to the (1) mechanics,
(2) scope, and (3) design of reform. First, how can a multilateral
mechanism reform but not replace the existing bilateral governance structure (“mechanics”)? Second, how can the rules in
older treaties be modernized and streamlined with those in
newer agreements in substance and procedure (“scope”)? Third,
how could states retain the flexibility to accommodate diverging policy preferences while simultaneously accepting necessary multilateral harmonization (“design”)? This section will
unpack each of these tensions between bilateralism and multilateralism underlying the reform of the tax and investment regimes.
A. Mechanics: How to Infuse a Bilateral Governance Structure
with Multilateralism?
The tax and investment regimes have experienced repeated
attempts to create a multilateral treaty. This is not surprising
given that multilateralism comes with distinct advantages.
Most importantly, it allows for the creation of uniform international rules that can be centrally administered and policed,
lowering transactions costs.182 The tax and investment Draft
Conventions of the past suggest that negotiators believed a
multilateral framework for allocating taxation rights and setting uniform norms of investment protection to be both possible
and desirable. At the same time, the fact that these attempts
failed suggests that states find it challenging to agree on universal norms. In addition, states may willingly choose bilateralism over multilateralism to benefit from the inherent flexibility
182. VANN, supra note 18, at 26.
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of bilateral arrangements. Indeed, there is evidence of customization in tax and investment treaties.
At their core, both the investment and tax regimes solve what
game theorists would call a coordination problem.183 In coordination games, players want to cooperate, but they struggle to
agree on the terms of cooperation because these terms have
distributional consequences.184 By the same token, states enter
into IIAs and DTTs because it is in their mutual interest to
avoid double taxation by foregoing some rights to tax, as well
as to make their markets more attractive to foreign capital by
compensating investors for some losses. Yet, states often disagree on what specific taxation rights to forego and what specific
losses to compensate.
Bilateralism gives states flexibility to solve the same coordination game in different ways.185 In international investment
law, states only engage in minor tailoring of treaty texts to specific bilateral relationships.186 However, countries do use the
flexibility bilateralism offers to design tailored national investment protection policies, often expressed through unique
model agreements that vary from one state to another.187 The
Gulf States, for example, offer generous investment protection
in their investment agreements.188 Turkey, Japan, and Canada,
in contrast, safeguard comparatively greater regulatory flexibility by including general exceptions into their treaties.189 Bilateralism in IIAs thus allows states to develop different answers to the question of what investment losses should be tak-

183. For tax law, see Thomas Rixen, Bilateralism or Multilateralism? The
Political Economy of Avoiding International Double Taxation, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
RELAT. 589 (2010).
184. Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory, and Law, 82 CAL. REV. 209, 222, 236 38 (2008).
185. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 169 72.
186. For instance, the BIT between Uruguay and the United States is almost identical to the BIT between Rwanda and the United States.
187. Investment treaties are characteristically based on national treaty
models, see CHESTER BROWN & DEVASHISH KRISHAN, COMMENTARIES ON
SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES (Chester Brown ed., 2013); Alschner
& Skougarevskiy, supra note 135, at 565.
188. Wolfgang Alschner, Dmitriy Skougarevskiy & Mengyi Wang, Champions of Protection? A Text-as-Data Analysis of the Bilateral Investment Treaties
of GCC Countries, 2016 INT’L L. REV. 5, 17 19 (2016).
189. Alschner and Skougarevskiy, supra note 15.

2019] MLI: A Model for Reforming Investment Treaties?

37

en up by the host state and what losses should stay with the
investor.
The same logic applies to the universe of double taxation
treaties. Here, the question is how to allocate the right to tax.
The OECD Model convention and the UN Model treaty distribute taxation rights differently, and states can base their DTTs
on either of these templates or opt for an altogether different
allocation.190 Bilateralism allows states to eschew a one-sizefits-all approach to the allocation of taxation rights and investment obligations, and to tailor rules to specific contexts.191
The flexibility advantages of bilateralism, however, are accompanied by costs. First, bilateral systems are difficult to reform in the aggregate as it is extremely costly to renegotiate
large networks of bilateral agreements treaty-by-treaty.192 A
multilateral reform would be more efficient. Second, bilateral
regimes struggle to address externalities, that is, situations
where the actions of third parties create costs for the contracting parties. That is why there is a tendency to strive for multilateral regimes in fields with strong externalities, such as trade
or climate change.193 As this article will discuss in detail below,
both cost factors, large-scale treaty modernization and externalities, are at the heart of the current tax and investment law
reform debate, and they make it difficult for states to retain a
governance model purely based on bilateralism.
The first structural challenge states face in squaring multilateralism and bilateralism in both tax and investment is thus
one of legal mechanics. On the one hand, states have repeatedly failed to agree on a multilateral replacement treaty and have
seized the flexibility bilateralism offers. On the other hand,
states also find it increasingly costly to rely exclusively on bilateralism to solve problems multilateral solutions would tackle more efficiently. So, what legal mechanisms would allow
190. RIXEN, supra note 17, at 172; Rixen, supra note 183.
191. Avi-Yonah, supra note 16, at 100; Brauner, supra note 131, at 1019.
192. Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 47, at 161; Taylor, supra note 30, at 305
06. While a multilateral treaty may be difficult to amend as well, it benefits
from centralized negotiation and a single ratification process, whereas bilateral agreements need to be renegotiated between pairs and require individual
ratification.
193. See, e.g., Thomas Rixen & Ingo Rohlfing, The Institutional Choice of
Bilateralism and Multilateralism in International Trade and Taxation, 12
INT’L NEGOT. 389, 407 09 (2007).
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states to create a middle ground that infuses some multilateralism into an otherwise bilateral governance structure?
B. Scope: How to Modernize Treaties in Substance and Procedure?
A principal cost of bilateralism, as well as a cause for the latest legitimacy crises in both systems, is a large treaty stock in
need of modernization. The BIT and DTT networks have been
built up over several decades, which means that treaties signed
in the 1960s coexist today with agreements from the 2010s.
This is problematic insofar as normative answers to the questions of “who is to tax?” and “what losses are to be compensated?” have evolved over time, leaving older agreements outdated. The existing treaty stock thus raises the challenge of
how to align the normative content of yesterday’s treaties with
today’s policy concerns and best practices.
Investment and tax treaties have been likened to incomplete
contracts.194 The idea of incomplete contracts is that contracting parties find it impossible to foresee all future contingencies
at the time of contracting and invariably leave contractual gaps
open.195 These contractual gaps can be filled ex post, including
through third party interpretation in the course of adjudication, or, alternatively, by the parties themselves when they
spot contractual gaps and update the bargain (e.g., through renegotiation or amendment).196 In practice, such incremental
updating often takes a path-dependent form as contracting parties refine, rather than replace, existing language in order to
close contractual gaps.197
The incomplete contracts model aligns closely with what is
observable in investment and tax treaty practice: states learn
194. RIXEN, supra note 17; Aaken, supra note 62; Wolfgang Alschner, Interpreting Investment Treaties as Incomplete Contracts: Lessons from Contract
Theory,
SSRN
ELECTRONIC
LIBRARY
(2013),
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2241652.
195. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,
83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2004).
196. SIMON A. B. SCHROPP, TRADE POLICY FLEXIBILITY AND ENFORCEMENT IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 83 94
(2009).
197. RIXEN, supra note 17; WOLFGANG ALSCHNER, Locked in Language: Historical Sociology and the Path Dependency of Investment Treaty Design, in
EDWARD ELGAR RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Mosche Hirsch & Andrew Lang, eds., 2018).
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from their experience with older agreements to draft new treaties that close contractual gaps that had hitherto been left
open.198 Initially ambiguous notions, such as a PE or “fair and
equitable treatment,” for instance, have been clarified over
time in a path-dependent manner through successive treaty
generations.199 At the same time, these modernizations have
been largely restricted to newly concluded agreements. Renegotiations of existing agreements take place, but are relatively
rare.200 As a result, older treaties, whose contractual gaps have
been left unaddressed, remain in force.
The obsolescence of treaty stock has become one of the root
causes for the legitimacy crises in both systems, as older
agreements with their larger normative gaps have become
prone to abuse or misinterpretation. In taxation, normative
ambiguity and indeterminacy of substantive provisions of older
agreements make it difficult to clearly delimit taxation rights
of residence and source states, which facilitates tax evasion as
companies exploit gaps left open in the treaty.201 Moreover,
technological change complicates the task of fitting new types
of business transactions, such as e-commerce, into existing
structures for the allocation of taxation rights, creating new
gaps.202 Furthermore, the relatively weak enforcement and in198. Manger & Peinhardt, supra note 65 (finding that investment treaties
become more precise over time); Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as
Informal World Tax Organization Through National Responses to Ecommerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 136 (2006) (highlighting the
role of the OECD Model and its commentary in helping to gradually update
tax treaties in response to unforeseen developments, such as the rise of ecommerce).
199. RIXEN, supra note 17; ALSCHNER, supra note 197.
200. Yoram Z. Haftel & Alexander Thompson, When do States Renegotiate
Investment Agreements? The Impact of Arbitration, 13 REV. INT’L ORGAN. 25
(2017).
201. Avi Yonah & Xu, supra note 47, at 160 (“Although tax treaties have
played an important role in eliminating double taxation and facilitating globalization of liberal investment and trade in past decades, the loopholes and
mismatches in existing treaties are one of the root causes of widespread unregulated BEPS opportunism”). For an in-depth discussion of normative indeterminacy in the context of tax treaties, see Sol Picciotto, Indeterminacy,
Complexity, Technocracy and the Reform of International Corporate Taxation,
24 SOC. LEG. STUD. 165, 169 72 (2015).
202. Leonardo F. M. Castro, Problems Involving Permanent Establishments:
Overview of Relevant Issues in Today’s International Economy, 2 GLOB. BUS.
L. REV. 125, 150 52 (2012).
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formation sharing structure in the majority of older DTTs
mean that these normative gaps remain largely unaddressed
through inter-state consultations or judicial gap filling. In sum,
contractual gaps in older double taxation avoidance norms are
partially responsible for the double non-taxation legitimacy crisis.203 While states have responded by incrementally adjusting
the substance and procedures in the OECD Model,204 these
changes serve as benchmarks for new treaties but do not alleviate the need for updating existing ones.
Similarly, in investment law, vaguely worded investment
protection clauses, which are particularly pervasive in older
IIAs, are partly to blame for the inconsistent and overly investor-friendly interpretations that are undermining the system’s
legitimacy.205 Interpretative gap filling by arbitral tribunals
has exacerbated, rather than alleviated, these concerns.206 Tribunals are constituted ad hoc for every dispute, are not bound
by formal precedent, and are not subject to appeal for inconsistency or incorrectness. Unsurprisingly then, tribunals have
interpreted similarly worded provisions very differently in
some cases.207 The UNCITRAL Working Group III has accordingly identified substantive inconsistency and incorrectness as
one of the key targets for investment law reform.208 Recent
agreements have sought to close contractual gaps through
more precise and clarifying language in treaty preambles, obligations, exceptions, footnotes, and annexes, in part to provide
more firm direction to tribunals.209 Yet, most investment arbitration cases are launched under treaties that pre-date these
203. Genschel & Rixen, supra note 4, at 164 66.
204. Picciotto, supra note 201, at 172 79.
205. UNCTAD, Interpretation of IIAs: What States Can Do, U.N. DOC.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2011/10
(2011),
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia2011d10_en.pdf.
206. Franck, supra note 5.
207. See, e.g., Filip De Ly et al., Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment
Arbitration – Are Investors and Host States on a Level Playing Field: The
Lauder/Czech Republic Legacy, 6 J. WORLD INVEST. TRADE 59 (2005). See also
UNCITRAL Secretariat, Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement
(ISDS):
Consistency
and
related
matters,
Secretariat
Note,
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150, Aug. 28, 2018.
208. UNCITRAL Secretariat, Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149, Sept. 5, 2018.
209. Spears, supra note 5; Henckels, supra note 65; Manger & Peinhardt,
supra note 65.
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recent changes in treaty practice.210 Moreover, the co-existence
of old and new agreements fuels treaty shopping practices as
claims are channeled through older agreements that lack the
policy space safeguards inserted into more recent treaties,
which undermines treaty design innovation.211 Hence, unless
older treaties are updated and normatively aligned with more
recent ones, the contractual gaps and ambiguities that plague
the investment regime will remain in place.
As such, outdated treaties contribute to inconsistent interpretations and facilitate treaty shopping and abuse, all of
which are at the heart of the tax and investment regimes’ current legitimacy crises. A second challenge that states face in
tax and investment law reform thus consists of modernizing
the scope of existing treaties, both in substance and procedure,
to align them with current treaty practices.
C. Design: How to Harmonize Rules While Accommodating Diversity?
A final common structural challenge relates to the need to
harmonize norms while accommodating differing policy preferences. On the one hand, as part of their current legitimacy crises, the tax and investment law systems each grapple with policy challenges that by their nature give rise to externalities,
which cannot be effectively addressed bilaterally and require
multilateral cooperation. For tax treaties, that policy challenge
involves reigning in non-taxation; for investment treaties, it
turns on achieving predictability in dispute settlement. On the
other hand, states continue to make use of bilateralism, which
enables them to customize agreements to suit national policy
preferences. So, how can a system be designed that strikes a
balance between harmonizing rules and accommodating diversity?
In international tax, profit shifting and tax base erosion are a
multilateral, rather than bilateral problem.212 In an ideal world
of full tax neutrality, investment decisions would be made
210. UNCTAD, Phase 2 of IIA Reform: Modernizing the Existing Stock of
Old-Generation Treaties, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2017/3 (2017),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d3_en.pdf.
211. Wolfgang Alschner, Regionalism and Overlap in Investment Treaty
Law: Towards Consolidation or Contradiction?, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 271, 289
(2014).
212. See Brauner, supra note 131, at 977 84.
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based on economic fundamentals, rather than varying tax rates
between states. In practice, however, differences in taxation
rates create externalities: they incentivize taxpayers to engage
in tax arbitrage to exploit differing tax rates.213 States, in turn,
can attract more capital by lowering their tax rate, thereby
fueling tax competition.214 Tax arbitrage and competition, in
contrast to taxation rights allocation, cannot be resolved
through bilateral treaties alone.215 As discussed above, avoiding
double taxation mimics the features of a coordination game, in
which states have an interest in coordinating but struggle to
agree on terms because these terms have distributional consequences. DTTs solve that coordination game by codifying a
compromise on the allocation of taxation rights. The political
economy of the avoidance of double non-taxation, in contrast,
follows the logic of a prisoners’ dilemma cooperation game.216
While states in the aggregate would benefit from avoiding tax
arbitrage and competition, individually, they have an interest
in lowering their tax rate unilaterally to snatch capital away
from other states.217 Cooperation games, therefore, turn on the
question of how unilateral defection can be prevented and mutually beneficial cooperation can be achieved.218
The purely bilateral governance structure of the pre-MLI tax
system is ill-equipped to solve such a cooperation problem.219 If
two states agree to curb tax arbitrage and competition, a third
state can easily undercut that deal by unilaterally reducing its
tax rate and thereby free-riding on the commitments of the
others.220 Moreover, even if all states were part of the bilateral
tax treaty network, the existing enforcement mechanism in
213. Vincent Arel-Bundock, The Unintended Consequences of Bilateralism:
Treaty Shopping and International Tax Policy, 71 INT’L ORGAN. 349 (2017).
214. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State, 7 HARV. L. REV. 105, 113; Rixen, supra note 157, at
209.
215. KOBETSKY, supra note 118, at 94 104.
216. RIXEN, supra note 17.
217. Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens and the Transparency Wave of International Tax Legalization, 37 UNIV. PA. J. INT’L L. 1153, 1155 56 (2015).
218. RIXEN, supra note 17; McAdams, supra note 184.
219. Kudrle, supra note 217, at 1158 68; KOBETSKY, supra note 118, at 94
105.
220. Brauner, supra note 131, at 1019 (“Enhanced coordination of tax laws
and policies is the key insight of the BEPS project: countries are now unable
to apply unilaterally their tax system, independent of all other countries.”).
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DTTs would be inadequate to deal with defection. The prevalent inter-state MAP was created for the largely self-enforcing
issue of tax coordination, but not the more acute enforcement
problem of tax cooperation where the risk of defection is higher.221 Addressing tax arbitrage and competition thus requires
multilateral elements that curb externalities, prevent freeriding, and deter defection.
International investment law faces a different challenge, but
one that similarly gives rise to externalities that cannot be
solved effectively absent a degree of multilateral harmonization. Formally, investment tribunals are constituted ad hoc to
settle one-off disputes. Yet, their publicly available awards are
routinely used as de facto precedents by investors, state respondents, and tribunals to support their arguments in unrelated subsequent cases.222 Awards thus produce important externalities by serving as informal but sometimes highly influential sources of legal reasoning for future decisions. The decentralized nature of ad hoc arbitration, however, means that
investment awards are ill equipped to serve a systemic precedential function; differences between the underlying facts and
treaties, varying tribunal compositions, and divergent interpretive approaches mean that there is necessarily a high degree of
inconsistency between awards.223
For a system created to promote tailored and predictable investment protection norms, the reliance on a pool of inconsistent decisions amounts to a negative externality. Divergent
prior investment case law leaves litigants guessing as to which
of a range of potential jurisprudential authorities a tribunal

221. See id. at 1017 18.
222. O. K. Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 301, 333 43 (2008); J.P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration A Citation Analysis of a Developing
Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 129, 135 37 (2007); Gabrielle KaufmannKohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT’L 357,
368 (2007).
223. Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 418 (2013); Rudolf Dolzer,
Perspectives for Investment Arbitration: Consistency as a Policy Goal?, 11
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2014) (noting the decentralized nature of the
field); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Is Consistency a Myth?, in PRECEDENT IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 137, 143 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi
eds., 2008) (noting that some solutions are treaty- or fact-specific).
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will follow.224 States cannot easily address these externalities
through bilateral contracting given that, even if they change
their treaty, they have no control over tribunals constituted
under third treaties whose awards may affect the interpretation of their agreements. Furthermore, reliance on precedent is
informal anyway, and as much a social phenomenon as a legal
practice, which makes it more difficult to regulate.225 Finally,
the minimalist and equally decentralized review through annulment or set-aside proceedings is insufficient to impose
meaningful quality control on the correctness of arbitral decisions.226 Wrong and inconsistent decisions can thus continue to
serve as precedents.227 Institutional solutions, such as a new
multilateral appeal tribunal or a standing court, are being
floated as part of the ongoing UNCITRAL Working Group III
deliberations.228 The intuition is that, if the investment arbitration system is to produce correct, consistent and predictable
results, a greater degree of standardization, harmonization,
and centralization is necessary.
As a result, the investment and tax regimes experience pressures for greater multilateral governance elements. Yet, as discussed above, states have shown little appetite for altogether
relinquishing their ability to develop varying answers to the
coordination problems of how to allocate the right to tax gains
of foreign investments, and of how to delineate the obligation to
compensate their losses. In both regimes, multilateral harmonization can thus only go as far as necessary to resolve each
system’s most pressing legitimacy concern, and it has to preserve, to the extent possible, states’ abilities to tailor their tax
and investment policies to their specific needs. The tax and investment regimes thus face a similar challenge: how to design
multilateral reform in a way so as to balance the need for

224. UNCTAD, Interpretations of IIAs: What States Can Do, supra note 205.
225. See G. Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and
Arbitrators, 2 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTL. 5 (2011).
226. Caron, supra note 82; Sacerdoti, supra note 82. As discussed in supra
Part II.B, unlike an appeal, the annulment or set-aside proceedings do not
assess the normative correctness of an award.
227. Wolfgang Alschner, Correctness of Investment Awards: Why Wrong
Decisions Don’t Die, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS (forthcoming).
228. Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic, and Paradigmatic Reform of
Investor-State Arbitration, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 410 (2018).
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greater harmonization and centralization with the continuing
necessity to accommodate divergent state preferences.
In short, common challenges emerge from the legitimacy crises in tax and investment law on how to square multilateralism with bilateralism when it comes to the mechanics, scope,
and design of reform. The remainder of this article will assess
how the tax regime managed to square that circle and discuss
whether the solution it adopts in the MLI is a viable template
for investment law reform.
V. THE MLI: A MULTILATERAL OPT-IN AGREEMENT TO REFORM
DTTS
The international tax regime addressed these three structural challenges of squaring bilateralism with multilateralism in
relation to the mechanics, scope, and design of reform through
the MLI. The MLI is a multilateral opt-in convention that updates covered DTTs in substance and procedure in order to
curb double non-taxation. The MLI thereby plays a crucial role
in mitigating the legitimacy crisis facing the tax regime. It is
not, however, supposed to eradicate tax arbitrage and tax competition by itself. Instead, it is part of the larger BEPS reform
package, which also comprises changes to domestic law and
other inter-governmental actions,229 and it is accompanied by
parallel efforts beyond BEPS to strengthen international administrative cooperation in tax matters.230
A. The Path to the MLI
The MLI is a consequence of the global financial crisis of 2007
and 2008. Following the crisis, the world’s leading developed
and developing countries, acting through the G20, identified
tax havens and harmful tax competition as a major source for
global financial instability and inequality.231 In the 2009 Lon229. Brauner, supra note 131, at 1022 23 (arguing that these complementary changes in domestic law and soft law may well be more significant than
the MLI); Christians, supra note 20, at 1621 40; Valderrama, supra note 11,
at 2.
230. These efforts center around the improved exchange of tax information
and the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters, see Miranda Stewart, International Tax, the G20 and the Asia Pacific: From Competition to Cooperation?, 1 ASIA PAC. POL’Y STUD. 484, 490 92
(2014).
231. Christians, supra note 20.
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don Summit Declaration, the G20 pledged “to take action
against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including tax havens,”
and tasked the OECD to study the issue.232 Progressively,
BEPS came to describe companies’ practices of minimizing exposure to taxation by exploiting tax differences between jurisdictions and the harmful effects of these practices on the tax
revenue of high taxation jurisdictions. To support the G20
agenda, OECD produced a report on BEPS in February 2013.233
The report resulted in a fifteen point Action Plan, which stated,
in relation to DTTs, that “[w]hilst bilateral tax treaties have
been effective in preventing double taxation, there is a concern
that they often fail to prevent double non-taxation.”234 The
2013 Action Plan noted the need for a timely modification of
existing treaties and recommended the development of an MLI
within two years (Action Point 15) to efficiently amend existing
DTTs in order to close loopholes that lead to BEPS.235
In line with the ambitious timeline set, work on the MLI proceeded swiftly. In 2014, an OECD report outlined the possible
legal contours of the MLI.236 In February 2015, endorsed by the
G20 and supported by the OECD, negotiations on the MLI
started in earnest through an open and inclusive ad hoc group
that in the end comprised representatives from more than one
hundred economies.237 Negotiations concluded more than a
year later in November 2016, and the MLI was signed in June
2017.238 Three months after receiving its fifth ratification, the
MLI entered into force on July 1, 2018. At the time of this writing, eighty-three jurisdictions have signed the MLI, including

232. Group of Twenty [G-20], London Summit Action Plan for Recovery and
Reform ¶ 15 (Apr. 2, 2009); see also G-20, Los Cabos Summit Leaders Declaration ¶ 48 (June 19, 2012).
233. OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013).
234. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 13 (2013).
235. Id. at 24, 34.
236. OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD,
DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO MODIFY BILATERAL TAX TREATIES
(2015).
237. OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD,
ACTION 15: A MANDATE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MULTILATERAL
INSTRUMENT ON TAX TREATY MEASURES TO TACKLE BEPS (2015).
238. OECD, MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT INFORMATION BROCHURE 3 (2015).
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all G20 countries apart from Brazil and the United States, and
nine states have ratified it.239
B. The MLI Mechanics: A Multilateral Opt-in Convention
The MLI takes the form of a multilateral opt-in convention,
which modifies DTTs under its scope. The MLI thereby leaves
the bilateral governance structure of the tax regime intact, but
adds a lightweight multilateral superstructure.240 Furthermore, as an opt-in convention, the MLI only applies to countries that are signatories to the convention. If all states were to
sign on to the MLI, it could thus apply to all of the more than
three thousand DTTs.
The legal mechanics underlying the MLI are inspired by general international law.241 According to Article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a later treaty
will prevail over an earlier one covering the same subject matter, provided that all parties to that later treaty are also party
to the earlier agreement. Article 30(3) of the VCLT is a conflict
rule, which means that the later treaty does not amend, suspend, or supersede the earlier one, but merely displaces it to
the extent that the earlier treaty is incompatible with the later
agreement. Differently put, the later treaty coexists with the
earlier agreement, albeit in a hierarchical relationship.242
The MLI follows the same model. Article 2 defines covered
agreements as DTTs in force between parties to the MLI, which
have been notified as falling under the MLI. Article 30 clarifies
that these parallel DTTs continue to exist and can in their turn
be amended. The MLI and DTTs thus apply in parallel. The
individual provisions of the MLI then determine how they relate to provisions on the same subject matter in covered DTTs.
239. Signatories and parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,
Status as of July 23, 2018, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mlisignatories-and-parties.pdf.
240. Brauner, supra note 131, at 1030 31.
241. OECD Directorate for Legal Affairs, OECD, Note, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting: Functioning under Public International Law, Note by the
OECD
Directorate
for
Legal
Affairs,
¶
16
(2015),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/legalnote-on-the-functioning-of-the-MLIunder-public-international-law.pdf.
242. See generally Bravo, supra note 135.
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Some MLI clauses will replace overlapping DTT language,243
others will modify parallel clauses,244 and again others will
complement them.245 Hence, the MLI and DTTs are in a hierarchical relationship: where conflicting MLI provisions exist, they
will displace the parallel DTT clauses.246
The MLI thus creates an efficient alternative to the piecemeal amendment of individual DTTs. It allows states to opt into a multilateral convention that updates, but does not replace,
their bilateral treaties. The MLI thereby constitutes a creative
solution to square bilateralism with multilateralism. The coexistence of the MLI and DTTs, however, also creates complexities since DTTs are not formally altered. The treaty text of
DTTs covered by the MLI remains formally unchanged, but has
to be read in light of the modifications introduced by the
MLI.247 To better navigate this complex web of interacting
norms, contracting states have to notify treaty provisions that
conflict with the MLI to the Secretary-General of the OECD,
the treaty’s Depositary.248 Moreover, the OECD Secretariat has
helpfully created an online tool kit that shows how the MLI
modifies individual agreements.249
C. The MLI Scope: Modernizing Substance and Procedure in
Older DTTs
The MLI implements several of the substantive and procedural concerns identified in the OECD BEPS project by modifying bilateral tax agreements falling under its scope. The most
important of these are the substantive minimum standards on
treaty abuse (BEPS Action 6) and the procedural minimum

243. MLI, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
244. Id. art. 5(3).
245. Id. art. 16(4)(b)(i); OECD, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO THE
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO
PREVENT BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 6 (2016). See also Avi-Yonah &
Xu, supra note 47, at 164.
246. OECD, supra note 245, at 6.
247. See also Picciotto, supra note 201. He points out that tax treaties have
to be interpreted in light of an increasingly growing web of soft law and hard
law, which make the tax system more complex than the plain and simple
language of DTTs would otherwise suggest.
248. MLI, supra note 1, art. 3(6); Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 47, at 168.
249. OECD,
MLI
Matching
Database
(beta),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/mli-matching-database.htm.
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standards on strengthening dispute settlement procedures
(BEPS Action 14).
In terms of substance, the MLI addresses three major areas.
First, it closes loopholes arising from varying rules on tax deductions (so-called Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements of Part II
of the MLI), which can result in double non-taxation. The interplay between tax jurisdictions can result in two deductions
being awarded for the same tax payment, or a deduction being
granted in the residence country without a corresponding taxation occurring in the source country.250 The MLI provides
greater clarity on when an entity counts as resident of a contracting party for tax purposes, and it limits deductions to the
income actually taxed to prevent a mismatch between the
two.251
Second, the MLI sets minimum standards to ensure that a
DTT is not used as a vehicle to facilitate non-taxation (Part III
of the MLI). This includes several components. The first is the
insertion of new preambular language into DTTs that clarifies
the parties’ common intention that the treaty should not create
opportunities for taxation avoidance or evasion.252 The second
component seeks to prevent treaty abuse by enabling states to
deny tax benefits derived through strategic treaty shopping.253
The clause gives taxation authorities broad discretion through
a Principal Purpose Test254 that allows a denial of tax benefits
where one of the principal purposes of corporate restructuring
was to gain access to that DTT benefit.255 Finally, the MLI contains several specific rules to curb tax evasion in relation to
specific transactions, such as short-term dividend transfers,
capital gains from stakes in immovable property, and the
channeling of funds through permanent establishments in
third jurisdictions.256

250. OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH
ARRANGEMENTS, ACTION 2 2015 FINAL REPORT 11 12 (2015).
251. See MLI supra note 1, arts. 3 5 and the accompanying commentary in
OECD, supra note 245, at 12 19.
252. MLI, supra note 1, art. 6.
253. Id., art. 7.
254. The test asks whether “obtaining that [tax] benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or
indirectly in that benefit.” MLI supra note 1, art. 7(1).
255. Johnston, supra note 2, at 387.
256. MLI, supra note 1, arts. 8 10.
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Third, the MLI broadens and clarifies the definition of a PE
for tax purposes (Part IV of the MLI). As discussed above, PE is
a crucial threshold concept defined in DTTs to establish the
source country’s authority to tax. The MLI prevents companies
from artificially avoiding that status to escape taxation
through commissionaire arrangements (Article 12), exempted
activities that are more than of a preparatory or auxiliary
character (Article 13), and contract-splitting to undercut timelimits that establish a PE (Article 14). 257
In addition to these substantive innovations, the MLI also introduces several procedural modifications aimed at improving
the dispute settlement procedures under DTTs. First, the MLI
strengthens and streamlines the inter-state mutual agreement
procedures (Part V of the MLI). Whereas most DTTs require
that a taxpayer initiate a MAP in their country of residence,
the MLI now allows them to launch the procedure in either
contracting state.258 The MLI also provides a set of rules to
render the MAP more effective, including by stipulating specific timelines. Second, the MLI introduces a complementary arbitration procedure for those disputes that cannot be resolved
through the mutual agreement procedure (Part VI of the MLI).
The default procedure follows the model of final offer arbitration (sometimes called baseball arbitration) whereby a panel of
three arbitrators selects the solution proposed by one of the
contracting parties.259 The arbitrators do not provide reasons,
proceedings are conducted in confidentiality, the final award
has no precedential effect, and the parties remain bound by the
decision unless they agree on an alternative solution.260 Even
though the procedure thus remains relatively rudimentary
compared to trade and investment dispute settlement, it is a
step towards greater legalization given that the majority of
DTTs do not yet contain such an arbitration mechanism.261
Moreover, the improvements to the enforcement mechanism
are important insofar as the tighter substantive rules aimed at
preventing non-taxation will likely trigger more disputes on
alleged over-taxation.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Johnston, supra note 2, at 389 90.
MLI, supra note 1, art. 16(1).
Id., arts. 20, 23.
Id., arts. 21, 23, 24.
Mooij, supra note 47.
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By codifying minimum standards that apply to all DTTs, the
MLI marks a radical departure from the status quo ante that
saw older treaties with contractual gaps coexist with newer
agreements where these gaps had been filled. While the OECD
Model had been continuously updated over the years to reflect
changes in international tax policy, it primarily served as a focal point for states to design newer generations of DTTs; apart
from the occasional renegotiation or a potential evolutionary
interpretation, older DTTs that had been signed on the basis of
earlier versions of the OECD Model remained unaffected by
these changes.262 The MLI overcomes this deficiency through
codifying “OECD soft law into hard law”263 by incorporating
innovations that used to be confined to the OECD Model into
binding multilateral treaty language that applies to all covered
DTTs. This explicitly aligns the norms of old and new DTTs on
matters covered by the MLI and thereby ends the coexistence
of treaties that differ drastically in their level of contractual
completeness.
In sum, the MLI does not fundamentally alter the normative
structure of the tax regime. States remain free to set their own
tax rates, and dispute settlement is still primarily in the hands
of state agencies. At the same time, the MLI introduces tailored yet ambitious adjustments to the regime in an effort to
modernize the stock of outdated agreements and lift all covered
DTTs up to the same level. Its substantive and procedural innovations close contractual gaps and make it considerably more
difficult to use DTTs as a vehicle for tax avoidance. These modifications help reorient the regime normatively in response to
its legitimacy crisis over non-taxation.264
D. The MLI Design: Squaring Flexibility with Minimum
Standards
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of the MLI is its elegant
design, which squares deference to states’ varying preferences

262. Christians, supra note 20, at 1610, 1614 17. The new BEPS minimum
standards are also incorporated into the latest version of the OECD Model
Convention.
263. Id. at 1643.
264. For a critical evaluation of the reform and its potentially missed opportunities, see Brauner, supra note 131, at 1034 38.
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with the setting of minimum standards.265 From the outset, the
OECD’s BEPS report noted that the MLI would need to offer as
much flexibility as possible to ensure that a maximum number
of states can join.266 Accordingly, the Convention provides contracting states with flexibility at every corner.267 First, it applies only to DTTs that contracting states notify and list as explicitly covered by the Convention.268 Signatories can thus exclude specific DTTs from the scope of the MLI, particularly in
instances where the DTTs already meet the BEPS standard or
are currently being renegotiated. Second, states can opt out of
certain MLI provisions in relation to all its notified treaties.269
Importantly, the flexibility to opt out does not extend to the
MLI substantive and procedural minimum standards that is,
provisions on treaty abuse and improvements to the MAP
except where DTTs already meet these minimum standards.270
Third, specific MLI articles allow signatories to deviate from
them for specific and limited purposes where alternative arrangements meet the same underlying policy goal.271 Fourth,
signatories can choose between varying versions of the same
clause.272 Finally, the MLI provisions on arbitration are of an
altogether different kind as signatories have to explicitly opt
into the mechanism,273 but can subsequently opt out of aspects
of the procedure274 or exclude it vis-à-vis specified DTTs.275 In
short, the MLI leaves contracting states with a great deal of
flexibility.

265. Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 47, at 162 (stating that the MLI is “both
principled and flexible”).
266. OECD, DEVELOPING A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT TO MODIFY BILATERAL
TAX TREATIES, ACTION 15, FINAL REPORT 19, 22 (2015), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/9789264241688en.pdf?expires=1544716425&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=7722DD4864
8A9B6A2D81267B8357D403.
267. OECD, supra note 245, at 3 4. See also Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note
47, at 163 64.
268. MLI, supra note 1, art. 2(1)(a)(ii).
269. See, e.g., id., art. 11(3).
270. See id., art.6(4).
271. See id., art. 7(15)(a).
272. See id., art. 5. This follows the OECD’s BEPS report, which proposed
different solutions for the same non-taxation problem.
273. See id., art.18.
274. See id., art. 23(2).
275. See id., art. 26.
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At the same time, the MLI also achieves a hitherto unseen
degree of harmonization through its minimum standards discussed above. The substantive standards on tax abuse and the
procedural standards on streamlining the MAP produce a normative convergence of all covered DTTs around the BEPS
agenda.
It remains to be seen how the MLI flexibilities interact with
this harmonization. Under the MLI, states enjoy discretion to
auto-determine what DTTs meet the BEPS minimum standard
and can exclude DTTs from the Convention. The OECD envisions a peer-review-based monitoring system through the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, a group consisting of 115 countries and jurisdictions, which is charged with monitoring compliance with the BEPS agenda generally.276 Starting in 2019,
the state representatives of this Inclusive Framework, together
with the OECD Fiscal Committee’s Working Group 1, began
publishing annual reports to monitor the implementation of the
minimum standards.277 The first such report on treaty abuse
was published in February 2019.278 This monitoring system
will place a check on states’ self-assessments and help ensure
that DTTs indeed met the minimum standards.
In sum, the MLI achieved a significant reform of the international tax system. It created a slim multilateral superstructure
that left parallel DTTs intact, updated thousands of DTTs in
substance and procedure, and managed to impose collective
minimum standards while allowing states the flexibility to contract out of and around other parts of the MLI. To be sure, the
MLI did not eradicate the problem of tax arbitrage and tax
competition.279 Given that the MLI is merely one piece in the
larger BEPS and tax reform agenda, that was never its ambi276. OECD, supra note 245, at 3.
277. OECD, BEPS Action 6 on Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in
Inappropriate Circumstances
Peer Review Documents ¶¶ 5 8 (2017),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-action-6-preventing-the-granting-oftreaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstance-peer-review-documents.pdf.
278. OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT,
PREVENTION OF TREATY ABUSE PEER REVIEW REPORT ON TREATY SHOPPING:
INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS: ACTION 6 (2019), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/9789264312388en.pdf?expires=1572563265&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=8D44A6162
B05C51A0E635DF3EBA099AF.
279. Stewart, supra note 230, at 492 (clarifying that BEPS did not directly
tackle tax competition).
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tion. It did, however, achieve a considerable realignment of the
tax treaty universe from an almost exclusive focus on double
taxation avoidance to an increasingly important mitigation of
non-taxation. This far-reaching reform was accomplished rather unobtrusively in a manner that preserved, stabilized, and,
in the eyes of some commentators, even strengthened and reinforced the tax system’s existing bilateral governance structure.280
VI. A MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT FOR THE INVESTMENT
REGIME?
Given the feat of the MLI to square bilateralism with multilateralism, and the fact that tax and investment law reform
shares similar structural challenges, the question naturally
arises whether the MLI experience can inspire similar efforts
in the investment regime. This article will argue that the MLI
indeed provides a useful blueprint for the mechanics, scope,
and design of a multilateral investment law reform. While
there is already precedent for using its mechanics in investment law reform, there is much less debate about whether a
reform of similar scope, covering both substantive and procedural elements, should be pursued in investment law, or to
what extent the design of MLI could inspire equivalent multilateral minimum standards paired with necessary flexibilities
in investment law.
A. Mechanics: Multilaterally Reforming BITs
Of the three aspects considered, the argument that the mechanics of the MLI can inspire investment law reform should
be the least controversial. Both regimes are built on thousands
of mostly bilateral treaties that can be reformed efficiently
through a multilateral opt-in treaty. Indeed, there is already
precedent for such an undertaking in investment law.
In 2017, the UN Convention on Transparency in Treatybased Investor-State Arbitration (“Mauritius Convention”) en-

280. That is because unilateral measures and soft law alternatives are institutional substitutes to DTTs. By reforming and reorienting the regime
around existing DTTs, the MLI supplies new justifications for their purpose
and existence. See Brauner, supra note 133, at 1038; Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra
note 47, at 213.
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tered into force,281 which employs similar legal mechanics. Not
unlike to the MLI, the Mauritius Convention is an opt-in convention covering and modifying IIAs between its signatories.282
In terms of scope, it incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
adopted in 2013, which are otherwise only applicable to recently concluded IIAs that specifically refer to the Rules.283
Michele Potestà and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler have further suggested that the mechanics of the MLI and the Mauritius Convention could be used to implement a more ambitious
ISDS reform, such as the introduction of a new multilateral
investment court or an appeal mechanism in existing IIAs.284
There is no legal reason, however, why such a reform needs to
be limited to procedure. The MLI, as seen above, modifies DTTs
that fall under its ambit in both substance and procedure. Similarly, an MLI in investment could also cover investment protection obligations in addition to, or even instead of, ISDS.
IIAs and DTTs cover a triangular relationship between host
state, home state and investor. The substantive obligations of
IIAs and DTTs are framed as inter-state promises, but the ultimate beneficiaries are the foreign investors whose income is
only taxed once and whose investment is protected against
regulatory interventions.285 What distinguishes IIAs from
DTTs is that dispute settlement under the latter remains
281. G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations Convention on Transparency in
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (the “Mauritius Convention on
Transparency”)
(Dec.
10,
2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency
_Convention.html.
282. According to Article 1, the Convention applies by default to all IIAs
concluded by the signatories to the Convention before April 1, 2014. However,
signatories can exclude specific IIAs from the scope of the Convention pursuant to Article 3.
283. See generally, Lise Johnson, The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments on the Treaty and its Role in Increasing Transparency of Investor-State
Arbitration,
CCSI
POL’Y
PAP.
(2014),
https://doi.org/10.7916/D8959J4C.
284. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potestà, Can the Mauritius
Convention Serve as a Model for the Reform of Investor–State Arbitration in
Connection with the Introduction of a Permanent Investment Tribunal or an
Appeal Mechanism?, CIDS - GENEVA CENTER FOR INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
(2016).
285. Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L. J. 353, 353 54, (2015).
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largely inter-state, whereas the arbitration mechanism in the
former creates a new and distinct legal relationship between
investor and host state once ISDS is triggered.286 Seen in this
light, reforming ISDS with its implications on direct procedural
investor rights should, if anything, be more controversial than
reforming substantive investment protection obligations, which
are framed as inter-state promises that create benefits but not
direct rights for investors.
In any event, the mechanics of the MLI can inspire reform in
investment law. They have already been used in the investment law sphere through the Mauritius Convention and could,
in the future, implement more ambitious reforms of IIAs in
both substance and procedure.
B. Scope: Completing Incomplete Contracts
The MLI experience also provides intriguing lessons for a
procedural and substantive modernization of the existing IIA
stock. Like IIAs, DTTs are incomplete contracts that need to be
updated over time. The MLI remedies shortcomings in older
agreements by closing loopholes that gave rise to treaty abuse.
It thereby mitigates the field’s legitimacy crisis surrounding
corporate non-taxation. Similarly, an MLI in investment could
plug contractual gaps in outdated IIAs by incorporating stateof-the-art language on how to balance investment protection
concerns with a host state’s regulatory interests, as well as how
to reform ISDS and regulate hitherto unaddressed grey areas.
To effectively modernize older IIAs, such a reform would need
to follow the MLI example and address both substantive and
procedural shortcomings in existing treaties. As discussed
above, outdated and ambiguous substantive rules are a part of
the legitimacy concerns associated with investment law insofar
as vague protective standards fail to predictably balance the
interests of investors with those of the host states. Recent IIAs
have closed contractual gaps left open in earlier agreements
not only by providing a more detailed ISDS procedure, but also
by clarifying substantive obligations and adding new policy exceptions.287 If these recent investment agreements are taken as

286. Id. at 354.
287. See, e.g., Aaken, supra note 62; Spears, supra note 5; Henckels, supra
note 65; Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment
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reflections of current best practices, then it makes little sense
to limit the updating of older agreements to procedure only.
Despite this, the current multilateral reform efforts at
UNCITRAL ostensibly focus exclusively on reforming ISDS
(i.e., investment law’s procedural shortcomings).288 Yet, part of
the concerns the UNCITRAL Working Group III has identified
relate to incorrectness and inconsistency, which are substantive defects of awards, not procedural ones. Some states, such
as Egypt, have acknowledged that inconsistency and incorrectness of arbitral decisions are substantive concerns during recent UNCITRAL deliberations:
The problem of inconsistency and unpredictability will remain
as long as there is this large part of overlapping treaties of international and investment treaties especially the old generations of bilateral investment treaties which involve inaccurate
drafting, uncontrolled drafting and indefinite drafting of the
rules of the protection of investment. . . . If the remit of the
work of the current working group does not allow it to address
the problematic of the rules of substantive protection of investment, I propose as a minimum recommending [a study of
substantive reform option].289

Other states have suggested that procedural fixes can help
address substantive investment concerns. The Romanian delegate at UNCITRAL remarked that:
[I]n terms of consistency and predictability, the issue here is
that too many investment treaties that are in force today are
first generation BITs. That means that the language that is
comprised in those BITs is vague. [ . . . ] It is very hard, complex process, very time-consuming process to change those
BITs and amend them. [ . . . ] So the obvious solution would
be to amend the ISDS mechanism to issue a set of procedural
rules for a permanent adjudication body that will be able to
Agreements, 12 (2008), https://www.biicl.org/files/3866_andrew_newcombe.pdf
(draft discussion paper prepared for BIICL Eigth Annual WTO Conference).
288. UNCITRAL, Annotated Provisional Agenda, Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform), Thirty-fourth session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.141, at ¶10 (Sept. 15, 2017).
289. Statement of Egypt during UNCITRAL Working Party III Thirty-fifth
session, 23 27 April, New York, reprinted in Anthea Roberts & Zeineb
Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Consistency, Predictability
and
Correctness,
EJILTALK!
(June
5,
2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-concerns-aboutconsistency-predictability-and-correctness/.
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interpret even first generation BITs in a manner that is consistent with both the interest of the investor but also with the
interest of the states, the host states that receive those investments. 290

Such procedural reform to address substantive concerns may
appear to be an expedient solution, but, in fact, it sets up adjudicators for failure. Imagine a multilateral investment court of
tenured judges that were to rigorously apply a consistent approach to treaty interpretation to resolve all investment disputes brought under existing treaties. Either that court would
arrive at differing interpretations as existing treaties differ in
wording, or the court would try to harmonize differences in
wording through interpretive gap-filling to achieve consistent
outcomes. Both results are undesirable. A court that pays too
much attention to differences in wording neglects the fact that
treaty practice has evolved. A BIT signed in the 1960s may not
mention the term “right to regulate” in its preamble or provide
an explanatory annex on indirect expropriation, but that does
not mean that states intended for older treaties to provide less
flexibility or more investment protection. Rather, as discussed
above, at least some of these omissions are better understood
as unanticipated contractual gaps that have been closed in
more recent agreements.291 A literal interpretation of outdated
language is thus not desirable.
So, what if the court opts for a more evolutionary interpretation and fills contractual gaps? Adjudicatory gap-filling is a
classic strategy when dealing with incomplete contracts,292 and
some investment arbitrators have indeed understood the vague
language in early BITs to “give adjudicators a quasi-legislative
authority to articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve
the treaty’s object and purpose in particular disputes.”293 The

290. Statement of Romania during UNCITRAL Working Party III Thirtyfifth session, 23 27 April, New York, reprinted in Anthea Roberts & Zeineb
Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Consistency, Predictability
and
Correctness,
EJILTALK!
(June
5,
2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-concerns-aboutconsistency-predictability-and-correctness/.
291. ALSCHNER, supra note 194.
292. See, e.g., SCHROPP, supra note 196.
293. Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 56 (2001).
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backlash against ISDS,294 as well as the current blockage of
WTO Appellate Body Member appointments by the U.S., which
accuses the body of judicial law-making,295 however, are cautionary tales against overreliance on judicial gap-filling.
Providing discretion to adjudicators to decide which treaty
terms matter and which do not is a recipe for frustration and
may well be an impossible task.296 Therefore, substantive consistency and correctness cannot be fixed through procedural
solutions alone. Instead, substantive problems require substantive solutions.
The MLI experience offers vital guidance in this regard. The
MLI updates outdated agreements by drawing on the language
of state-of-the-art treaty practice to fill contractual gaps in both
substance and procedure: a practice that could be replicated in
the IIA context.
For instance, the tax MLI modernizes the preambles of DTTs;
similarly, an investment MLI could add references to host
state’s regulatory prerogatives in the preambles of IIAs where
they are not yet present.297 The tax MLI furthermore clarifies
what is and what is not a PE for the purpose of taxation; likewise, an MLI in investment could delineate what IIAs cover
and do not cover under the term “investment.” The refined substantive tax allocation rules of the MLI (e.g., in relation to hybrid mismatch arrangements) could be templates for refining
substantive investment protection rules, and the newly updated MLI denial of benefits clause could inspire updating denial
of benefits clauses in an MLI in investment. Similar to the MLI
in tax, the MLI in investment could also make clear that it does
not affect treaties that already follow best practice standards.
The MLI would also provide an opportunity to clarify grey areas between substance and procedure that fall within the exist294. Waibel et al., supra note 5.
295. On the WTO appointment crisis and the U.S. arguments, see Tetyana
Payosova, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, & Jeffrey J. Schott, The Dispute Settlement
Crisis in the World Trade Organization: Causes and Cures, PIIE POLICY
BRIEFS, (Mar. 2018), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pb18-5.pdf.
296. The Statement of Romania cited in supra note 290 illustrates this difficulty by asking adjudicators to read outdated treaties ”in a manner that is
consistent with both the interest of the investor but also with the interest of
the states, the host states that receive those investments.” These three sets of
interests, however, often diverge.
297. Spears, supra note 5 (noting that recent agreements include language
safeguarding policy space in their preambles).
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ing UNCITRAL reform mandate and that have not been addressed in existing treaties. In its Thirty-seventh session in
April 2019, the Working Group III asked the UNCITRAL Secretariat, for example, to undertake a study on indirect investment claims by shareholders for subsequent consideration by
the states.298 In indirect claims, a company’s shareholders request compensation on behalf of the company for damages to
the company’s assets. Claims for such indirect or reflective
losses are controversial because municipal systems do not typically allow investors to step into the shoes of the company to
claim its losses and because they can result in multiple proceedings whereby the company and its majority and minority
shareholders all launch parallel proceedings against the same
measure, but under multiple IIAs.299 Although claims for indirect losses have a procedural dimension (i.e., multiple parallel
proceedings), they also relate to the scope and substance of investment protection (i.e., how far shareholder rights extend in
investment law). As such, they belong to a grey area between
substance and procedure, which is left largely unaddressed in
existing agreements. An MLI on investment, on the other
hand, could regulate reflective losses in all covered IIAs in one
stroke.
The valuation of damages is a second grey area issue that is
scarcely regulated in existing IIAs and has generated the most
infamous example of arbitral inconsistency to date. Two investment cases, Lauder v. Czech Republic and CME v. Czech
Republic, arose out of identical facts (governmental interference with a broadcasting licence) relating to the same investment (the company CME, in which Lauder was a shareholder),
but resulted in fundamentally different outcomes Lauder’s
298. UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of its Thirty-seventh session ¶ 84 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/970
(2019),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/
acn9_970_as_sub_1.pdf.
299. UNCITRAL, Possible future work in the field of dispute settlement:
Concurrent proceedings in international arbitration, Note by the Secretariat
¶¶
41 43
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN.9/915,
(Mar.
24,
2017)
https://undocs.org/A/CN.9/915. See also, OECD, Investment Treaties and
Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: Insights from Advanced Systems of
Corporate Law, (OECD Working Papers on International Investment,
2014/02); David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties and Shareholder Claims:
Analysis of Treaty Practice, (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2014/03).
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case was dismissed, whereas his company, CME, won 270 million US dollars in damages.300 Although the claims were
brought under two different BITs, the difference in outcomes
resulted not from the substantive treaty law, but from how the
two tribunals dealt with concurrent causation in the determination of damages an issue on which the BITs were silent.
Whereas the Lauder tribunal dismissed the claim arguing that
concurrent, intervening factors caused the damage alleged to
result from the treaty violation,301 the CME tribunal found that
concurrent causes (except contributory fault) do not attenuate
the damage caused by the treaty violation.302 To prevent such
inconsistencies, any reform needs to clarify how tribunals are
to valuate damages, including how they should deal with legal
causation. Again, the MLI could provide a framework for addressing these issues left unregulated in existing treaties.
The MLI thus offers an attractive template to lift all IIAs up
to the same level and to clarify procedural and substantive
clauses as well as normative grey areas, which are at the heart
of the current legitimacy crisis. An investment MLI would
thereby correct the awkward current co-existence of outdated
treaties and updated ones. It would also complete incomplete
treaties in light of state-of-the-art practice to ensure a consistent and correct application of investment law.
C. Design: Balancing Harmonization and Diversity
The MLI also offers a design blueprint for reforming investment law. The MLI model is unlike any multilateral investment treaty hitherto debated. It preserves the essentially bilateral governance structure of the regime and leaves parallel bilateral treaties fully intact. At the same time, an MLI in investment would also impose a multilateral superstructure to
300. Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Award (Final), Sept.
3, 2001. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, Sept. 13, 2001. See also, UNCITRAL, Possible reform of investorState dispute settlement (ISDS): Consistency and related matters, Note by
the Secretariat ¶ 12 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150 (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.150.
301. Lauder v Czech Republic, ¶ 234.
302. CME v. Czech Republic, ¶ 583. See also, Wolfgang Alschner, Aligning
Loss and Liability – Towards an Integrated Assessment of Damages in Investment Arbitration, in THE USE OF ECONOMICS IN TRADE DISPUTES: LESSONS
LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD (Carpenter, et al. 2017).
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address policy problems that would be inefficient to resolve bilaterally (i.e., updating older treaties), or that entail externalities that are impossible to tackle without multilateral elements
(i.e., the consistency and correctness of awards). In addition, an
investment treaty modeled on the MLI design would offer flexibility at every step to contract around or out of some of its rules
while imposing binding minimum standards elsewhere.
This ability to deliver global standards where needed while
preserving national preferences where possible is an attractive
model for investment law because its multilateral reform will
need to strike a similar balance to be successful. During the
UNCITRAL deliberations, several states stressed that differences between IIAs cannot be reduced to contractual gaps and
drafting oversights. Israel, for instance, noted that “variation
[amongst treaties] represents the different approaches countries have towards protection and promotion of investment.”303
Similarly, the United States stated that “[s]tates have taken a
great deal of care in crafting these obligations with great specific intent, and that minute differences in the way they have
drafted correspond to very important differences in both legal
and policy objectives.”304 The reform of substantive investment
law thus needs to be able to accommodate different approaches
to investment policymaking to gain widespread support.
Such divergent views are not limited to the substance of investment protection, but also extend to procedural ISDS reform. States are divided among incremental reformers who prefer adjustments to the existing arbitration mechanism (like Japan or the United States), systemic reformers demanding more
radical change (like the EU pushing for the creation of a multilateral court system), and a third group of states that want to
shift paradigms altogether (like Brazil) and prefer to rely on
303. Statement of Israel during UNCITRAL Working Party III Thirty-fifth
session, 23 27 April, New York, reprinted in Anthea Roberts & Zeineb
Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Consistency, Predictability
and
Correctness,
EJILTALK!
(June
5,
2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-concerns-aboutconsistency-predictability-and-correctness/.
304. Statement of the United States during UNCITRAL Working Party III
Thirty-fifth session, 23 27 April, New York, reprinted in Anthea Roberts &
Zeineb Bouraoui, UNCITRAL and ISDS Reforms: Concerns about Consistency, Predictability and Correctness, EJILTALK! (June 5, 2018),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reforms-concerns-aboutconsistency-predictability-and-correctness/.
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domestic courts, dispute prevention mechanisms, and interstate arbitration rather than ISDS.305
In striking a balance between necessary harmonization and
the need for continued flexibility and differentiation in substance and procedure, states can draw inspiration from the
MLI design. Some elements of substantive investment law are
actually very amenable to MLI-like international minimum
standards. Several core investment treaty norms, such as protection from manifest discrimination and arbitrariness or compensation for expropriation, are arguably also part of customary international law and thus de facto already provide a kind
of global minimum standard.306 An investment MLI would offer
an opportunity to clarify and codify the contours of this customary international law minimum standard, as well as spell
out the content of customary international flexibilities (e.g., on
police powers). Together, this package of norms could provide a
substantive baseline that states could not contract out of. Such
uniform standards would help, in turn, to promote the consistent and correct application of investment law where minimum standards are concerned.
Other investment treaty standards, including the role of investors’ legitimate expectations, liberalization commitments, or
performance requirements are more controversial and could be
left outside the scope of the MLI to be dealt with in bilateral
treaties or included in the MLI through optional clauses that
signatories can opt into.
Similarly, on the procedural side, states could make certain
aspects obligatory for all MLI signatories. Candidates for such
procedural minimum standards include dispute prevention
tools and inter-state mechanisms for the authoritative interpretation of investment norms. With respect to more contested
issues, such as ISDS, where views diverge widely, states could
follow the MLI model and make adjudication optional. Recall
305. Roberts, supra note 228.
306. There is, of course, considerable controversy over the content (and even
existence) of customary international law on investment. The 1967 OECD
Draft Convention was, in part, inspired by custom, see Boas, supra note 121;
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Brief History of International Investment Agreements, A, 12 UC DAVIS J. INT’L POL’Y 157, 159 (2005). But the relationship of
BITs and customs remains controversial, see Patrick Dumberry, Are BITs
Representing the New Customary International Law in International Investment Law, 28 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 675, 680 (2009).
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that Part VI of the tax MLI foresees arbitration as an opt-in
rather than opt-out mechanism. Similarly, states could include
a reformed ISDS mechanism that enjoys widespread support
into an investment MLI but leaves it to states whether they
want to join. This would then allow countries willing to commit
to an international investment court or another multilateral
body in that MLI to do so, while allowing those states less keen
on the idea to stay out.
Of course, the exact contours of such an MLI on investment
would have to be fleshed out. Indeed, agreeing on when to defer
to states’ divergent preferences and what to harmonize may
prove to be the most controversial aspect of such a negotiation.
But, at least the MLI would offer a design that eschews extremes and allows creative solutions that open up a middle
ground between national preferences and multilateral harmonization.
In conclusion, the MLI mechanics, scope, and design offer an
attractive template for multilaterally reforming investment
law. An MLI in investment would preserve the current bilateral governance structure of the regime while fixing the problems that a uniquely bilateral system is ill-equipped to handle.
The last section of this article will build on that insight and assess how feasible such an MLI in investment would be. In that
context, the focus of this article will shift from similarities to
differences between the tax and investment regime to show
that the conditions that gave rise to the MLI are not (yet) present in the investment space.
VII. CONVERGENCE IN TAX, DIVERGENCE IN INVESTMENT
Even though the tax and investment regimes mirror each
other in many ways, they also differ in important respects.
These differences matter when considering the feasibility of
reproducing the tax MLI experience in the investment law context. The MLI is the result of a broad political, normative, and
epistemic convergence in the tax world. In contrast, the investment regime is currently marked by growing divergence.
As such, before states can replicate the MLI in investment,
they first need to prepare the ground through more consensus
building. Current multilateral investment law reform efforts
under the auspices of UNCITRAL may provide fertile ground
for that.
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A. Political Convergence in Tax, but not Investment
First, the taxation regime has benefitted from an important
political convergence, as the interests of (most) rich, developed
countries have become aligned with those of developing states
in combatting tax avoidance. At the same time, in the field of
investment, the positions within and between developing
states, emerging powers, and developed countries are increasingly misaligned.
The MLI is a product of the 2007 and 2008 financial and economic crisis. That historical moment brought the tax dossier to
the G20 and created a broad consensus to reform the global financial system.307 As part of that agenda, tackling harmful tax
practices was a low-hanging fruit insofar as rich developed
countries, fast-growing emerging economies, and poor developing states could all support the proposition that tax arbitrage
and competition were problematic when they eroded national
tax bases. The defenders of the status quo, in contrast, were a
small group of low-tax jurisdictions that had benefitted from
tax arbitrage, which allowed them to attract foreign companies
through low or no taxation and reap ensuing employment opportunities and other spill-overs. In terms of inter-state politics, the issue was thus relatively clear-cut: a small group of
beneficiaries with little bargaining clout was pitted against a
global coalition of large developed, emerging, and developing
states. There was thus sufficient political consensus and momentum to address BEPS through coordinated international
action in a very short time span.308
The current political situation in the field of investment looks
very different. States take widely diverging views on what is
wrong with the current investment law system and how it
should be reformed.309 As Anthea Roberts highlights, some
states are content with the current system and the incremental
improvements made to recent agreements, while others push
for a systemic or even paradigmatic reform.310 Importantly,
these divergent positions split the G20. Each of the BRICS
countries takes a different view on the appropriate path for in-

307.
308.
309.
310.

Brauner, supra note 131, at 1025.
Id. at 1019.
Roberts, supra note 228.
Id.
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vestment law’s future.311 In the developed world, the EU and
Canada’s preference for a standing court clash with Japan’s
preference for preserving investor-state arbitration, albeit in
reformed guise, while the United States has become skeptical
of ISDS altogether.312 Moreover, investment law has become a
politically salient issue, making it more difficult for states to
compromise.313 In short, the broad political consensus that has
propelled the MLI is absent in investment law.
B. Normative Convergence in Tax, but not Investment
A second important difference concerns the normative evolution of both regimes. Whereas bilateral taxation treaties have
grown more similar over time, in part thanks to the leadership
of the OECD acting as a common reference point, investment
treaties have actually grown more diverse, even as international organizations seek to assert influence over the field’s development.
Empirical research on international tax treaties points to a
great normative convergence.314 First, newly concluded DTTs
are much more similar to each other than they were in the
past.315 While there continue to be some outliers, like the United States, it is not unusual for DTTs involving different parties
to display a textual overlap of eighty percent or more.316 Second, a main driver for this greater homogeneity is that states
conform their texts more closely to the OECD Model Convention. As discussed above, the OECD Model Convention was
first published in 1963, but has since been amended regularly

311. BRICS stands for the emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, China
and South Africa. Roberts, supra note 14.
312. Roberts, supra note 228.
313. Investment arbitration provisions triggered mass protests in the context of free trade negotiations between Canada and EU, the CETA, for instance. Furthermore, Belgium’s regional parliament in Wallonia temporarily
blocked the signature of CETA citing concerns over investment rules. See,
e.g., Belgium seeks EU court opinion on EU–Canada free trade deal,
EURACTIVE
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/ceta/news/belgium-seeks-eu-court-opinionon-eu-canada-free-trade-deal/.
314. Arel-Bundock & Lechner, supra note 12. See also AVI-YONAH, supra
note 21, at 2 3; Christians, supra note 20, at 1614 15.
315. Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 47, at 157 58.
316. Id. at 157.
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through the OECD Fiscal Committee.317 In addition to the text,
the OECD publishes an extremely detailed commentary to explain the Convention’s provisions, which is widely used by
states and courts as an aid in the interpretation of tax treaties.318 Whereas states initially departed more liberally from
the OECD Model, they now mirror it more closely as the OECD
serves as focal point for the normative evolution of tax treaties
and contributes to the normative convergence of tax treaties.319
This convergence, in turn, facilitated the work of the MLI since
differences between DTTs were not as pronounced as one would
suspect in a network of bilateral treaties without formal centralization. The MLI could harness this relative homogeneity
and leverage the work that had gone into updating the OECD
Model and its commentary to codify targeted adjustments in
the MLI.
Empirical research on international investment treaties
points in the opposite direction.320 National models that mirror
each other in principle but diverge in language, at times significantly, shape the design of investment treaties.321 National
approaches to IIA design have grown further apart over the
last decade as states are experimenting with new clauses or are
creatively combining existing language to break with the pathdependency and incremental adjustment that long dominated
the field.322 Canadian, Mexican, Turkish, and Japanese BITs
today look very different from each other, and even within the
EU, member states’ approaches to treaty design are growing
more diverse.323 Even the consensus around what were long
described as core investment protection norms, such as fair and
equitable treatment and most favored nation treatment, are
eroding as states choose to omit them from their agreements.324
317. Cockfield, supra note 198, at 140.
318. KOBETSKY, supra note 118, at 153 78; Christians, supra note 20, at
1616 17; Cockfield, supra note 198, at 142.
319. Cockfield, supra note 198 (calling the OECD an informal World Tax
Organization); Christians, supra note 13.
320. Alschner, supra note 15.
321. Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 135; BROWN AND KRISHAN, supra
note 187.
322. Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 135.
323. Id.
324. See, e.g., the recent Indian Model BIT. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral
Investment
Treaty
(2016),
http://www.dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ModelBIT_Annex_0.pdf.
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In part, this divergence in investment law is a result of the absence of normative focal points. Whereas the OECD published
its first investment model convention roughly at the same time
as its tax model, the template never gained the same traction
and was never updated. International organizations, including
the OECD, but also the World Bank and UNCTAD, as well as
non-governmental entities, sought to shape investment treaty
design through research papers, model conventions, guidelines,
and principles. Yet, while informing individual agreements,
none of these international organizations established a standard that exerted a gravitational pull similar to the OECD Model in tax law.325 Whereas convergence in tax facilitated the
MLI, divergence in investment is making an equivalent project
more difficult.
C. Epistemic Convergence in Tax, but not Investment
A third important difference concerns those who write investment and tax rules. The tax regime was established by and
around a tightly-knit expert community that first formed under
the auspices of the League of Nations during the inter-war period, then found a new home in the Fiscal Committee at the
OECD after the Second World War, and continues to dominate
international tax governance to this date.326 Investment law
experts, in contrast, remain fragmented across national and
professional boundaries. The result has been epistemic convergence in tax, but not in investment law.
The international tax regime is inextricably linked to a
transnational network of tax experts. Many of the principles
and rules of international tax law were crafted in the early
twentieth century by groups of international tax experts (e.g.,
“The Four Economists,” and “The Technical Experts Committee”) working under the League of Nations.327 Some of these
experts served both in the League of Nations and later in the
OECD, ensuring intellectual continuity in times of rapid insti-

325. Wolfgang Alschner, et al, Shaping Investment Rules: The Imprint of
International Institutions on Bilateral Investment Treaties, (Paper presented
at APSA Annual Meeting, 2017).
326. Christians, supra note 13; Genschel & Rixen, supra note 4.
327. PICCIOTTO, supra note 43, at 19 22; Christians, supra note 13, at 10
14.
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tutional change.328 By framing the avoidance of double taxation
as a technical task rather than a political problem, the design
of tax treaties was left almost exclusively to this expert community.329 International tax law thus became a domain for
transnational specialists.330 This not only removed double taxation issues from high politics, but also insulated the tax community from other groups. Martin Hearson’s archival research
on British DTTs, for instance, documents how little influence
diplomats and the Foreign Office had over DTTs.331 Instead,
the UK’s international tax policy was dominated by a small
group of tax specialists, often with close relations to the business community.332 These tax experts, given their prized
knowledge, also represented their countries at the OECD,
where the OECD Fiscal Committee provided a venue for tax
experts to meet and shape international tax policy by updating
the OECD Model Convention and its commentary.333 It was
this transnational community of tax experts that facilitated the
convergence around the OECD Model and offered expertise,
which the G20 could tap into, when it came to designing and
implementing measures to counter BEPS.334 This also helps to

328. For instance, Mitchell B. Carroll started working on double taxation in
the inter-war period and accompanied the codification efforts of the 1930s
and 1940s. Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law: Benefits for American
Investors and Enterprises Abroad: Part I, INT’L LAW. 692 (1968). In fact, even
after the League of Nations collapsed, the work on double taxation that had
been undertaken under its auspices continued relatively undisturbed, resulting in successive draft conventions in 1943 (Mexico) and 1946 (London) before
the OECD took over the coordination of international efforts to avoid double
taxation in the late 1950s and early 60s.
329. Christians, supra note 13, at 9 (“the League’s main function was to
correct an existing international political malfunction, by creating a decisionmaking structure that focused on coordination as primarily a matter of collaborative technical problem solving rather than primarily a matter of diplomatic relationships.”); Genschel & Rixen, supra note 4, at 163.
330. Christians, supra note 13.
331. Martin Hearson, Transnational Expertise and the Expansion of the
International Tax Regime: Imposing ‘Acceptable’ Standards, 15 REV. INT’L
POLIT. ECON. 647, 656, 660 (2018).
332. Id.
333. Christians, supra note 13, at 21 22; Genschel & Rixen, supra note 4, at
161 65.
334. Christians, supra note 20 (also pointing out that the BEPS project provided an opportunity for the OECD to entrench its role as the international
focal point for tax policy); similarly Fung, supra note 180.
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explain why the highly technical BEPS reforms could be crafted in such a short time span.
No similar transnational community of experts underpins the
investment regime. First, investment law has been defined
more by national than transnational considerations. The early
BIT programs of Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium in the
1960s were developed in parallel, rather than in concert, with
the OECD work, which resulted in some initial experimentation.335 It was only in the 1970s that BIT newcomers like Great
Britain or Sweden took greater inspiration from the OECD’s
work.336 But, much in contrast to the OECD Tax Model, the
OECD’s Draft Convention on investment and its commentary
were not updated over time. States instead developed independent national models that they updated incrementally.337
Second, investment treaties remained the domain of diplomats, not of technocrats. Poulsen and Aisbett’s empirical work
suggests that BITs were often concluded to coincide with diplomatic visits or the end terms of ambassadors.338 In contrast to
the technical language of DTTs, BITs contained intuitive principles (that made some signatories believe that they were signing statements of good will rather than binding commitments).339 Moreover, the link between investment treaties and
the business community appears to have been more tenuous as
political risk managers and agencies often remained unaware
or disinterested in the instrument that supposedly served their
needs.340
335. Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Consistency and Legal
Innovation in the BIT Universe, (Stanf. Public L. working paper, 2015) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2595288.
336. ALSCHNER, supra note 197.
337. Mark A. Clodfelter, The Adaptation of States to the Changing World of
Investment Protection through Model BITs, 24 ICSID REV. 165, 166 68
(2009); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Model Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Way
Forward, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 307, 312 14 (2011).
338. Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, Diplomats Want Treaties: Diplomatic Agendas and Perks in the Investment Regime, 7 J. INT’L DISP.
SETTL. 72, 87 90 (2016).
339. Poulsen, supra note 146, at xv, 155.
340. Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign
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397 (2010) (providing empirical evidence that businesses and political risk
insurers do not systematically take BITs into account when making decisions
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Finally, even though a transnational community of investment negotiators did not previously exist, the proliferation of
investment cases has given rise to a community of investment
arbitration practitioners.341 Part of the current investment law
legitimacy crisis is directed at the self-interest of that arbitral
community,342 and, as a result, there are tensions between
practitioners with vested interests and negotiators that seek to
reform the current system. The arbitral community itself is
split between those supporting (e.g., Gabrielle KaufmannKohler)343 and those criticizing (e.g., Charles Brower)344 current
reform efforts. Hence, in contrast to tax, states do not have a
cohesive expert community to rely upon to help tackle the current legitimacy challenge. Instead, those with expertise in investment treaties and arbitration are divided along national
and professional lines.
In summary, the conditions that paved the way for the MLI
in tax are absent in investment law. That does not by itself exclude a future investment MLI, but it suggests that further political, normative, and epistemic consensus building is necessary to lay the groundwork for such an endeavor. The current
UNCITRAL Working Group III deliberations can be an ideal
venue for such consensus building. They bring together representatives from a geographically diverse set of countries, are
open to stakeholder input from academia, civil society, and the
arbitral community, and could thus facilitate epistemic convergence.
Crucially, to enable wider consensus-building, these
UNCITRAL deliberations should not be limited to narrow, procedural fixes to ISDS. Some states have openly endorsed the
view that UNCITRAL talks should be broadened. In its submission to the Working Group III, South Africa, for example,
stressed that many of the regime’s legitimacy problems can only be addressed through substantive reforms, and that proce341. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (1998); Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 387, 388 (2014).
342. Langford, Behn, & Lie, supra note 87.
343. KAUFMANN-KOHLER & POTESTÀ, supra note 284.
344. Charles N. Brower, Doomed to Failure: Why the EU Investment Court
System is Destined to Fail Both Foreign Investors and Host Statese, 3 EUR.
INVEST. L. ARB. REV. ONLINE 317 (2018).

72

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 45:1

dural and substantive concerns cannot be divorced from each
other.345
Some may be concerned that widening the scope of the
UNCITRAL talks may render an already difficult task (ISDS
reform) even more difficult and could jeopardize a reform altogether. But this does not have to be the case. In its 2019 spring
meeting, Working Group III decided to split its work into two
ISDS reform tracks: more ambitious structural reforms and
more limited other reforms. A third track could be added to
tackle substantive concerns and normative grey areas. Alternatively, substantive discussions could be taken out of the
UNCITRAL process altogether and run in parallel. For example, building on the model of its Inclusive Framework for tax,
the OECD could host a similarly multilateral framework to
complement the UNCITRAL deliberations and address substantive investment law concerns, as well as the abovementioned grey areas. What matters in the end is not where
talks take place, but that they take place in order to create the
political, normative, and epistemic convergence that could enable an MLI in investment that holistically addresses the field’s
legitimacy concerns in both substance and procedure.
CONCLUSION
The investment and tax regimes display striking similarities.
They both facilitate the free flow of international capital, they
are both based on thousands of bilateral treaties, and they both
share common historical foundations and evolved in similar
ways. Yet, whereas the tax regime recently achieved a groundbreaking reform that mitigates a decades-old legitimacy crisis
over non-taxation through the MLI, which modernizes covered
DTTs in both substance and procedure, the investment regime
is just beginning to discuss multilateral reforms to address its
own legitimacy problems.
As this article has shown, the MLI provides an attractive
model for such investment law reform. In terms of mechanics,
it promises to leave the existing bilateral governance structure
345. UNCITRAL, Possible Reform of Investor State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS), Submission from the Gov’t of South Africa ¶¶ 19 2- U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.176,
(July
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intact, while complementing it with tailored multilateral elements. In terms of scope, an MLI in investment could modernize the stock of existing and often outdated IIAs in both substance and procedure. Finally, in terms of design, the MLI
shows the way for creating multilateral minimum standards
where necessary, while providing sufficient flexibility to accommodate diverging policy preferences elsewhere.
Yet, as the last section has shown, an epistemic, normative,
and political convergence in taxation prepared the ground for
the MLI. The investment regime, in contrast, is experiencing a
period of divergence, which makes an MLI equivalent for investment currently unlikely. The first step to enable a future
MLI in investment must therefore consist of providing an enabling environment where political, normative, and epistemic
forces can converge. The current UNCITRAL Working Group
III deliberations could turn out to be just that.

